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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the ro l e  of  market and normarket forces  i n  a f f i c t ing  
It examines the  process the rate and bias of technical  change i n  agr icul ture .  
of  generation of innovations and investment i n  agr icu l tura l  reseamh and 
explores, i n  the context of p o l i t i c a l  econcxny, the  sources of deviation from 
the equilibrium rate and bias of  technical  change. 
It is argued tha t  a theory of the rate and bias of technological 
innovation must go beyond the  analysis  of market forces  because they explain 
only a f rac t ion  of  changes i n  investment and productivity in agricul ture .  
Such a theory must a l s o  take in to  account i n s t i t u t i o n a l  forces which, on the  
one hand, d i s t o r t  and supplant market mechanisms and, on the  o the r  hand, act 
independently of  prices on the determination of investment and productivity. 
I n  par t icu lar ,  the act ion of t h e  state and its modes of intervention must play 
a central ro l e  i n  the analysis  of investment i n  ag r i cu l tu ra l  research. 
It is further argued t h a t  t he  ro les  played by the  various ac tors  
involved i n  ag r i cu l tu ra l  research-=the s t a t e  and the National Research 
Institutes, the Internat ional  Agricultural Research Centers, and t h e  private 
sector--are being redefined a s  research moves in to  the  "Post-Green Revolution" 
era. I n  par t icu lar ,  the  private sec tor  is being increasingly involved i n  
research, and the work done a t  the I A R C s  modifies the research p r i o r i t i e s  of 
the NRIs. New mechanisms of i den t i f i ca t ion  of research p r i o r i t i e s ,  of 
coordination of  research programs, and of par t ic ipat ion of soc ia l  groups 
affected by research need t o  be devised t o  increase ef f ic iency  and equ i ty  in  
the research e f f o r t .  
Empirical evidence i n  support of these proposi t ions-and,  f o r  t h a t  
matter, of any propositions concerning investment i n  research--is still 
fragmentary. Because of t he  inconsistencies i n  t h e  ex is t ing  da ta  o r  t h e  
absence of data i n  cer ta in  a reas  ( f o r  instance, on investment on a canmodity 
basis), the  argument i n  t h i s  paper is mostly supported by c i rcuns tan t ia l  
evidence and case studies.  
America. 
Attention has been mainly focussed on Latin 
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SECTION 1 
SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION: 
PROPOSITIONS ON INVESTMENT IN AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH 
In this sect ion, we state without elaboration the major proposit ions of 
this paper. In 
Section 2,  we present a framework for the analysis of technological innova- 
tions which aims at taking market and nonmarket forces into consideration. 
Section 3, we look at the existing data on the present level and growth trend 
in research expenditures. In Section 4 ,  we review the methodology used in 
cost-benefit studies of agricultural research projects to examine whether they 
support the underinvestment thesis. In Section 5, political-economic con- 
siderations that might explain underinvestment are then examined. 
6, we look at the problem of variability in financial resources which is a 
major factor of instability of the research process. 
the commodity bias in research. 
ferent modes of involvement of the state in the research process. Finally, 
Section 9 draws conclusions from the analysis and implications concerning the 
role of International Centers. 
The arguments are then developed in the body of the paper. 
In 
In Section 
In Section 7, we examine 
Section 8 presents three case studies on dif- 
1. Market forces explain only partly long-run changes in investment and pro- 
ductivity in agriculture. These changes, to a large extent, are influ- 
enced by institutional forces. 
operation of market forces in the determination of prices. 
institutional forces act on the determination of investment and produc- 
tivity independent of the condition of relative prices. 
These forces both distort and supplant the 
In addition, 
market forces institutional forces 
technological 
policy economic 
policy 
relative prices 
investment 
technology (rate & bias) 
productivity 
2 .  In spite of a rapid increase in the level of investment in agricultural 
research, there is no indication that the gap between optimum and actual 
levels of investment has been reduced. The result is continual underin- 
vestment in agricultural research and a suboptimum rate of technological 
change. 
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3. 
4. 
Because there is a high com lementarit between public (especially re- 
search and infrastructure _p___y and private investment in agriculture, public 
underinvestment acts as a bottleneck on productivity and output growth in 
agriculture. 
future food supply and with the unique role of the public sector in agri- 
cultural research, this complementarity is increasingly important; and 
underinvestment in public agricultural research can be increasingly bind- 
ing on the growth in food supply. 
With the growing importance of agricultural research in 
Many explanations have been advanced of the tendency for underinvestment 
in agricultural research. They include: 
a. 
b. 
C. 
d. 
e. 
f. 
g* 
h. 
i. 
The existence of institutional and geographical externalities. 
The tendency for governments to underestimate ex ante the ex post 
net benefits of agricultural research. 
The difficulty of taxing agriculture (land tax or income tax) to 
finance public expenditures in research, with the result that 
there is insufficient public investment and that other fonns of 
taxation--which are politically easier to enforce (low agricul- 
tural prices and indirect taxes>--create both allocative dis- 
tortions and usually regressive distributive consequences. 
The political constituency of Schumpeterian entrepreneurs is 
small which reduces their capacity for collective action. 
The political constituency of potentially benefited consumers 
(lower food prices) and employers (lower nominal wages) is large, 
but the gains for individual consumers and employers are small 
which induces free riding. 
There is insufficient investment in human capital, especially 
research administrators and applied scientists. 
There is a lack of correspondence between technological and 
political horizons when the state acts in response to a crisis 
situation: 
trade policy, and labor policies--are then preferred over 
technological policies with longer maturation periods. 
short-run instruments--such as price interventions, 
There is a lack of coordination between technological and eco- 
nomic policies that undervalues the potential gains of research 
efforts. 
There is underrepresentation of specific social interests (peas- 
ants, marginal regions, etc.) at the level of the state and the 
public sector, with a consequent neglect of investment in many 
areas of high potential economic payoffs. 
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j. There is a general  undervaluation of agr icu l tura l  products i n  the  
context of cheap food pol ic ies  and urban biases.  Unfavorable 
terns of trade f o r  agr icu l ture  discourage new investments and 
s t i f l e  the demand fo r  technological innovations or iginat ing among 
producers. 
5. Investment i n  ag r i cu l tu ra l  research is characterized bv a high leve l  of 
v a r i a b i l i t  eve; though research is a long-term enterpr i se  n& only i n  
d e  maturation time of specif ic  pro jec ts  but mainly i n  terms of 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  building and s taff ing.  The-main detenninants- of i n s t a b i l i t y  
appear t o  be ( a )  the high va r i ab i l i t y  i n  foreign a id  budgets f o r  research; 
(b)  domestic economic i n s t a b i l i t y  which des tab i l izes  publ ic  budgets; and 
(c)  a greater  degree of i n s t a b i l i t y  i n  agr icu l tura l  research budgets than 
i n  public budgets due t o  a bias  against  agr icu l ture  tha t  is exacerbated i n  
periods of economic downswing. 
On a commodity basis, export crops receive more research a t t en t ion  than 
food crops; and some products, such as cassava, tha t  are important sub- 
sistence crops f o r  peasants but are not consumed i n  urban areas and have 
no indus t r i a l  use are neglected by research e f f o r t s .  
grown by resource-poor farmers tend t o  be neglected because the latter are 
unable t o  voice t h e i r  demand f o r  new technology a t  the leve l  of the 
state. Neglect i n  research is self-perpetuating. The time lag between 
i n i t i a l  investment and research r e s u l t s  is longer f o r  neglected crops than 
f o r  more established crops, and the state tends t o  favor the l a t t e r ,  par- 
t i c u l a r l y  i n  periods of economic crisis and t i g h t  budgets, because it 
y ie lds  short-term payoffs. 
6. 
b r e o v e r ,  crops 
7.  There have been important i n s t i t u t i o n a l  changes in  the a l loca t ion  of re- 
search resources. I n i t i a l l y ,  National Research I n s t i t u t e s  (NRI) , under 
the umbrella of the state, were bu i l t  around the model of technological 
'konverters" t o  f a c i l i t a t e  dissemination and loca l  adoption of technology 
avai lable  internat ional ly .  But several developments, which are the prod- 
uc t s  of s t ruc tu ra l  changes tha t  have taken place i n  th i rd  world economies, 
have modified the context of agr icu l tura l  research. 
the  i n i t i a t i v e  as a r e su l t ,  among other f ac to r s ,  of work conducted by the  
International Centers. Simultaneously, pr ivately funded research is in-  
creasingly taking place i n  areas where benef i t s  can be eas i ly  appropriated 
by pr iva te  groups; and the pr inciple ,  "who benef i t s  pays," i s  applied t o  
obviate the f inanc ia l  crisis of the NRIs, thus reinforcing the tendency 
toward underinvestment i n  areas  where public research is required. 
The NRIs have l o s t  
8. Case studies  show tha t  research s t r a t eg ie s  are successful when the s t a t e  
acts from above and pushes f o r  a negotiated solut ion of confl ic t ing in t e r -  
ests i n  response t o  an agrarian crisis tha t  a f f e c t s  large const i tuencies  
at the nat ional  level .  In other cases, the state acts from below i n  re- 
sponse t o  the i n t e r e s t s  of spec i f ic  groups and implements po l i c i e s  de- 
signed t o  solve pa r t i cu la r  problems obstructing the development of a 
productive sector .  
state from below, research e f f o r t s  may lead t o  production increases. 
the po ten t i a l  demand f o r  research is not t ranslated in to  ac tua l  demand 
when pa r t i cu la r  soc ia l  classes linked t o  agr icu l tura l  production are too 
weak t o  mobilize and coordinate government ac t ion  i n  t h e i r  favor. 
When these groups a r e  powerful enough t o  ac t iva t e  the 
But 
-4 - 
SECTION 2 
"EORIES OF TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION: MARKET VERSUS INSTITUTIONAL FORCES 
2.1. Rate and Bias of Technological Change 
A t  the  leve l  of the firm, technological change can be f u l l y  characterized 
by its b ias  and i ts  rate (Diamond, 1965). The b i a s  of technological change is  
given by the difference i n  the rates of change i n  the marginal product iv i t ies  
of f a c t o r s  due t o  technology. It measures which f ac to r  of production is made 
re l a t ive ly  more productive by technology and, hence, which fac tor  is tech- 
nology aiming a t  subs t i tu t ing  i n  production. Technological change can, f o r  
example, be land-saving o r  laborsaving according t o  whether it increases most 
the rate of change i n  the productivity of land o r  t ha t  of labor. Land-saving 
technology allows the subs t i t u t ion  of technology ( cap i t a l )  f o r  land i n  produc- 
t i o n  and, thus, increases  i n  the l eve l  of yield.  Laborsaving technology sub- 
s t i t u t e s  technology f o r  labor and, thus, allows increased productivity of 
labor. To analyze the b i a s  of technological change a t  the l eve l  of t he  coun- 
t r y ,  the concept of b i a s  needs t o  be extended t o  include the d i f f e r e n t i a l  
productivity-enhancing e f f e c t s  of technology not only among fac to r s  but a l s o  
among a c t i v i t i e s ,  production systems, farms, and regions. In a l l  cases, the 
notion of b ias  r e s u l t s  i n  d i f f e r e n t i a l  rates of productivity growth due t o  
technology among fac tors ,  p r o d x t s ,  production systems, farms, and regions. 
The rate of technological change i s  the rate i n  the  growth of output t h a t  
cannot be explained by the observed change i n  the l eve l s  of fac tor  use. 
p r inc ipa l ly  conditioned by two sequential  processes: 
resources i n  the generation of technological innovations and (2)  the t r ans fe r  
and d i f fus ion  of innovations among users. For both b i a s  and rate, neoclassi-  
cal theory gives us the concept of an equi l ibr iun b ias  and an equi l ibr iun 
rat e. 
It is 
(1) the investment of 
According t o  the theory of induced innovations, the equi l ibr iun fac tor  
b i a s  w i l l  be tha t  b i a s  which equal izes  the marginal productivity r a t i o  of fac- 
t o r s  t o  the fac tor  p r i ce  r a t i o .  
the meta production funct ion which gives the set of a l l  ex is t ing  and po ten t i a l  
technologies that can be developed with the ex is t ing  state of s c i e n t i f i c  
knowledge. By allowing f o r  changes i n  production functions,  the equilibrium 
b ia s  of technological change thus increases the poss ib i l i t y  of fac tor  subs t i -  
t u t i o n  i n  response t o  changes i n  r e l a t ive  f ac to r  pr ices  r e l a t ive  t o  ad jus t -  
ments f o r  a given technique. And by allowing t o  subs t i t u t e  f o r  the fac tors  
becoming r e l a t ive ly  scarcer, technology checks the rise i n  pr ices  of these 
fac tors  and gives greater  s t a b i l i t y  t o  fac tor  shares.  
s imi la r ly  be defined among products, production systems, farms, and regions. 
Marginal product iv i t ies  are calculated along 
Equilibriun biases  can 
The concept of an equi l ibr iun r a t e  der ives  from both optimun investment i n  
research and optimum di f fus ion  of innovations. Optimun investment i n  research 
i s  indicated by equal izat ion of the in te rna l  rate of return t o  research t o  the 
rate of re turn i n  other government projects .  Underinvestment i n  ag r i cu l tu ra l  
research w u l d  thus be indicated by an in te rna l  rate of return above tha t  of 
a l te rna t ive  investments. 
the innovation whenever it is profi table  f o r  entrepreneurs t o  do so under 
equilibriun (shadow) pr ices  and f u l l  access t o  supportive in s t i t u t ions  
(markets, c r ed i t ,  infonnation, e tc . ) .  
Optimun diffusion corresponds t o  a f u l l  adoption of 
konomic theory thus gives us a well-defined characterization of w h a t  
should be the optimum bias  and r a t e  of technological change at a pa r t i cu la r  
point i n  time. In practice,  t h i s  f u l l  potent ia l  of technology f o r  a greater  
efficiency i n  the a l loca t ion  of resources i s  ra re ly  f u l f i l l e d .  There exist 
serious d is tor t ions  i n  the bias  and r a t e  of technological change that resu l t  
from the p o l i t i c a l  economy of the environment where technological change 
occurs. 
the d is t r ibu t ion  of economic and p o l i t i c a l  power i n  c i v i l  society. 
Key i n  the determination of these biases is the role  of the state and 
We are principally concerned here with the generation of innovations ( a s  
opposed t o  diffusion) and w i l l  explore, i n  the context of p o l i t i c a l  economy, 
what are the sources of deviation from the equilibriun bias  and rate of tech- 
nological change. 
par t icu lar  types of technological change depend more than anything on the in- 
come and d is t r ibu t ion  e f f e c t s  which technology is  expected t o  produce. 
w i l l  be done mainly with reference t o  Latin America. 
Pressures on the state t o  sa t i s fy  c l i e n t e l e  demands f o r  
T h i s  
2.2. Neoclassical theow of Induced Innovations 
In the neoclassical  paradigm, explicit o r  implicit  markets are postulated 
t o  exist with f l ex ib l e  prices.  
havior, markets determine the al locat ion of resources and the choice of tech- 
niques. 
resources and t o  t h e i r  e f f i c i en t  u t i l i za t ion .  
maximum output can always be achieved by a real locat ion of resources. 
over, i f  there are no increasing returns t o  scale i n  the economy, the case f o r  
the competitive pr ice  system is strongest i n  the sense tha t  any complaints 
about i t s  operation can be reduced t o  complaints about the d is t r ibu t ion  of 
income which can then be r ec t i f i ed  by t ransfers  between producers and/or con- 
sumers. 
market i n  the absence of accepted leve ls  of income inequal i ty  as K. Arrow 
(1970, p. 62) has sbwn; but they imply that the problem of a l locat ion of re- 
sources can be separated from the problem of the d i s t r ibu t ion  of control  over 
these resources. Since a l l  resources have an opportunity cost determined by 
market forces,  the a l loca t ion  of own resources i n  production i s  made i n  t e rns  
of a user cost equal t o  market pr ices  with the resu l t  that the al locat ion of 
resources (and the  choice of techniques) is unaffected by resource ownership. 
The problems of resource al locat ion and resource ownership are, thus, fu l ly  
separable. Stated another way, what the postulate  implies is tha t  economics 
(pr ice  determination on markets and the al locat ion and use  of resources) can 
be separated from p o l i t i c a l  economy (social  classes which are, i n  large pa r t ,  
defined by unequal control over asse ts ) .  
s t r ik ing  i n ,  f o r  instance, neoclassical  models of peasant households such as  
those of Lau, Yotopoulos, Chou, and Leu (1981) and of Ahn, Singh, and Squire 
(1981). 
labor categories,  perfect  subs t i t u t ab i l i t y  i s  implied between family and hired 
Given p ro f i t  o r  net-revenue maximizing be- 
The resul t  i s  tha t  market forces lead t o  the f u l l  employment of a l l  
Given the stock of resources, 
More- 
These propositions provide no basis fo r  accepting the resu l t  of the 
T h i s  separation is par t icular ly  
By postulating the existence of perfect  labor markets f o r  a l l  family 
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labor. The resu l t  is, as Lau and Jorgenson (1969) have shown, tha t  optimal 
production decisions regarding the a l loca t ion  of resources can be separated 
from c o n s q t i o n  decisions.  
characteristic of peasants and their competitive edge against  c a p i t a l i s t  farms 
is t h e i r  access t o  ca tegor ies  of family labor with no opportunity c o s t s  on the  
labor market, i.e., labor market f a i lu re ,  these models miss the essence of 
what are peasants. 
I f  we agree, by cont ras t ,  t ha t  the essential 
The neoclassical  paradigm of perfect  markets and separabi l i ty  be twen 
problens of resource a l loca t ion  and resource ownership was applied by Hayami 
and Ruttan t o  the inducement of technological innovations. 
t o  explain the f a c t o r  b i a s  of technological change. The causal sequence be- 
gins  with changes i n  r e l a t ive  f ac to r  s c a r c i t i e s  that lead t o  changes i n  rela- 
t i v e  f ac to r  pr ices  under the assumption t h a t  markets do m r k .  
turn,  guide technological advances toward saving on the fac tors  that become 
re l a t ive ly  more expensive. Since agr icu l tura l  research is largely a publ ic  
good, it is the state that responds t o  market s igna ls  i n  a l locat ing funds t o  
a l t e rna t ive  research programs. This occurs i n  response t o  producer denands 
f o r  technologies that allow t h e m  t o  save on the fac tors  that are becoming 
r e l a t ive ly  more expensive and t o  increase p r o f i t  levels .  Changes i n  resource 
e d o m e n t s  thus determine through market forces  the b ias  of technological in- 
novations within the  confines  of the momentary innovation p o s s i b i l i t i e s  given 
by the state of science. In comparing the long-run h is tory  of technological 
charlge i n  Japanese and U. S .  agricul ture ,  f o r  ins taxe,  Hayami and Ruttan 
found that, i n  labor-abundant but land-scarce Japan, technology has been 
mainly land saving, allowing t o  rapidly increase the  productivity of land. 
In  the United S ta tes ,  by cont ras t ,  where land was abundant and labor scarce, 
technology was mainly laborsaving and allowed rapid increases  i n  the prod=- 
t i v i t y  of labor.  
The theory intends 
Prices ,  i n  
In  judging the usefulness of the theory of induced innovations as an ex- 
planatory framemrk of the b i a s  of technological change, the relevant question 
is: 
cal evidence from the PR(JTAAL studies i n  Latin America (Pineiro and Trigo),  
are that: 
How much does the theory explain? The answers, based largely on empiri- 
1. 
2 .  
3 .  
I t  explains more i n  the long run when r e l a t ive  f ac to r  scarci- 
ties have becane more f u l l y  ref lected i n  r e l a t ive  f ac to r  
p r i ces  and when the a l loca t ion  of public sec tor  research 
budgets have s t a r t ed  t o  respond t o  prof it -maximization possi  - 
b i l i t i e s  f o r  producers within the po ten t i a l  of s c i e n t i f i c  
research. 
I t  explains more technological change i n  the aggregate f o r  the 
whole ag r i cu l tu ra l  sec tor  than f o r  spec i f i c  crops, f a m s ,  and 
regions. 
It explains more the adoption than the generation of innova- 
t i ons  and 
those are more 
a b i l i t y  considerat ions than public sector  research. 
r iva t e  sec tor  research than publ ic  since both of 
i r e c t l y  guided by pr ice  s igna ls  and p r o f i t -  
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4. It works b e t t e r  f o r  advanced c a p i t a l i s t  democracies where 
markets are more d e v m n d  the state r e l a t ive ly  less in- 
te rvent ionis t  than i n  most t h i rd  world count r ies  i n  which 
markets notably f a i l ;  where the state is generally act ively 
involved i n  economic a f f a i r s ;  and where the  d i s t r ibu t ion  of 
wealth and p o l i t i c a l  power (and, hence, influence on the 
s t a t e )  is highly unequal and more so than it ever was i n  the  
modern h is tory  of advanced economies. 
The theory thus does not adequately explain generation of technology i n  a con- 
t e x t  where markets tend t o  f a i l ,  where the state is highly in te rvent ionis t ,  
and where the short  run matters t o  hunan survival.  I t  thus f a i l s  t o  deal  with 
the main components of the "agrarian question" i n  the th i rd  world--inadequate 
access t o  food f o r  many, poor performance of agr icu l ture  i n  a s s i s t i ng  economic 
development, and extensive r u r a l  poverty. This, of course, does not mean that 
pr ices  do not matter: 
generation of technology w i l l  be prof i table  f o r  the pr iva te  sector  and adop- 
t i o n  prof i tab le  f o r  pa r t i cu la r  groups of producers. 
necessarily r e f l e c t  shadow values, net pr ices  are generally not the same 
across soc ia l  groups, and the state does not necessar i ly  respond t o  r e l a t ive  
p r i ces  i n  a l locat ing resources t o  agr icu l tura l  research. 
they do, pa r t i cu la r ly  i n  determining whether the 
But market pr ices  do not 
"Getting the pr ices  right" is, thus, necessary but not suf f ic ien t  f o r  an  
optimun rate a d  b ia s  of technological change. 
creat ing production incentives,  nonprice pol icy e f f o r t s  t o  r a i s e  y i e ld  through 
public investments i n  technology and inf ras t ruc ture  are essent ia l .  The reason 
why pr ices  are systemically found t o  be a weak determinant of long-run 
aggregate supply i n  agr icul ture  is precisely due t o  the f a i l u r e  of public 
investment i n  agr icu l ture  i n  a s i t ua t ion  where there  exists a high degree of 
complementarity between publ ic  and pr ivate  investment. 1 Public underinvest - 
ment, i n  addition, increases the va r i ab i l i t y  of ag r i cu l tu ra l  output and leads 
t o  subs t i tu t ion  of pr iva te  f o r  publ ic  inputs which favors  the wealthier farm- 
ers who can afford it and tends t o  bias technological change toward labor- 
saving mechanical innovations. 
While p r i ces  are important i n  
2.3 .  A St ruc tu ra l i s t  Theory of Indwed Innovations 
A non-neoclassical theory of induced innovations is based on two 
premises. 
ro le  t o  play t o  that of market forces.  This is  clearly a l l  the more important 
One is tha t  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  forces  have an  important complementary 
when markets openly f a i l  e i t h e r  because they do not e x i s t  o r  because of- state 
interventions,  externalities and public goods, excess supply at prevail ing 
pr ices  with downward i n f l e x i b i l i t y  (e.g., surplus labor) ,  o r  the existence of 
market power through d i f fe ren t  i n s t i t u t iona l  mechanisms ( r e s t r i c t ed  competi- 
t i on ,  bribery,  e tc . ) .  In s t i t u t iona l  forces  can thus act i n  the determination 
of r e l a t ive  pr ices  ( resu l t ing  i n  ' p r i c e  d is tor t ions"  r e l a t ive  t o  their deter-  
mination by unchecked market forces) ,  of technological innovations, and of 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  change i t s e l f .  In Figure 2.1, these are ident i f ied  as the 
s t r u c t u r a l i s t  loops by cont ras t  t o  the neoclassical  loop where market forces  
determine r e l a t ive  p r i ces  and technological innovations. 
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I Change in resource endowments 
Change in relative prices 
I 
Neo-classical 
loop: market 
forces 
innovations - Change in technology Structuralist 
loops : institutional 
forces 
Rules of institutional 
Change in institutions 
Figure 2.1 - Market and Institutional Forces in the Inducement of Innovations 
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The second premise of a structuralist theory of induced innovations is a 
different rule of survival for technological and institutional innovations. 
In the neoclassical paradigm, technologies and institutions survive only if 
they are allocatively efficient in a given economic environment and they 
change when they fail to satisfy the criterion of allocative efficiency and 
are replaced by new ones with a superior allocative efficiency. Neoclassical 
economists have thus explained the permanence of institutions such as tradi- 
tional agriculture (Schultz) and sharecropping (Cheung) on the basis of their 
allocative efficiency in a given context. 
sector induced technological innovations in terms of the generation of that 
technological alternative within the confines of momentary scientific capabil- 
ities which optimizes resource allocation (Ahmad). 
They have also explained public 
A structuralist approach to technological and institutional change intro- 
duces another rule of survival for innovations. 
ency as a meaningful criterion of selection because markets are seen to fail 
in many different ways. The result is that there exists no global allocative 
efficiency and that what matters for the survival of innovations is "class 
efficiency" rather than allocative efficiency, namely, the effectiveness of 
technologies and institutions in allowing surplus appropriation by a specific 
social group. Particular technologies and institutions may thus be class ef- 
ficient in allowing surplus appropriation by a specific social group (land- 
lords or large farmers, for instance) while eventually creating a great deal 
of global allocative inefficiencies and a net social loss. This is how, for 
instance, Badhuri (1983) has explained technological stagnation in a context 
where interlocked land and credit markets allow landlords to extract surplus 
through perpetuation of debt peonage and usurious credit terms. 
It rejects allocative effici- 
A structuralist theory of induced innovations thus locates the determin- 
ants of technological innovations in both changes in relative prices and in 
direct institutional forces where prices themselves are influenced by institu- 
tional forces that distort them away from the efficiency prices that could 
presumably have resulted from the free play of market forces. 
point, it is useful to catalogue the sources of distortions that a struc- 
turalist approach reveals relative to the neoclassical paradigm for the de- 
termination of the rate and bias of technological change. 
As a starting 
We reemploy for this purpose a framework developed some years back to 
characterize the supply and demand of technological innovations (de Janvry, 
1977). We use this framework to locate the various sources of distortions; 
that is, the social and political elements from which departure from equili- 
brium rate and bias originate (see Figure 2.2). 
(1) the role of 
the socioeconomic structure which influences the formation of expected and 
actual payoffs; (2) the unequal distribution of information about technology 
which affects the latent (potential) demand for innovation; ( 3 )  the political 
structure and the patterns of state behavior which affect the way in which 
latent demand is transformed into actual demand; ( 4 )  the degree of "articula- 
tion" between institutions that are demanders and suppliers of technology. 
Four major sources of distortions can be distinguished: 
3 
SOCIOECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
Sta te  o f  Science 
Land tenure: assets d i s t r i b u t i o n  
Product and f a c t o r  p r i ces :  
Figure 2 . 2  - Supply and Demand f o r  Technological Innovat ions 
Diffusion , 
global  p r i c e  d i s t o r t i o n s  
group-specif i c  p r i c e  d i s t o r t i o n s  
non-price b a r r i e r s  payoffs  
Access t o  inpu t s  and i n s t i t u t i o n s :  Actual  
d matrix 
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A. Socioeconomic Structure 
The first source of distortion is the characteristics of the socioeconomic 
structure which influence the formation of expected and actual payoffs. 
include : 
They 
a. 
b. 
C. 
d. 
e. 
f. 
Market failures that lead to product and factor price distor- 
tions such as surplus labor (unemployment) which implies that 
wages are not determined by supply and demand on labor markets. 
Government interventions in the price mechanism such as price 
fixing, subsidies, and overvaluation of the exchange rate. 
Macroeconomic and monetary policies that affect real prices 
such as Dutch disease and inflationary spirals. 
Social groups' specific product and factor price distortions. 
Different social groups face different prices for the same 
product or the same factor. 
access to markets and to complex patterns of interlocking in 
product and factor markets. 
access to institutional rents (subsidized public credit, sub- 
sidized water rights, etc.) which are distributed by nonmarket 
mechanisms. These unequal prices are, in part, determined by 
unequal asset distribution (dualism) and by unequal mobiliza- 
tion of political power. 
This is due to their differential 
It is also due to differential 
Nonprice barriers. 
barriers in either their direct use of technology or in deriv- 
ing benefits from technological change. 
clude access to inputs, access to markets, availability of 
nontraded factors, skill differentials, etc. 
Different social groups face different 
These barriers in- 
Land tenure patterns affect the payoffs from technology 
through economies of scale (indivisibilities in tubewell irri- 
gation and machinery), the extensiveness of homogenous crop- 
ping patterns, etc. 
B. Information Structure 
A second source of distortions is in the formation of a latent (potential 
The state, in particular 
demand for innovations. 
the potential payoffs from technology is imperfect. 
may have a misconceived perception of the potential gains from technological 
change. This will be all the more the case if there is little communication 
(articulation) between those who budget research, those who generate new tech- 
nologies, those who are the potential users of new technologies, and those who 
will ultimately benefit from technological change. 
potential benefits from technological innovations is also highly unequally 
distributed among potential beneficiaries (or losers) with, typically, peas- 
ants, landless workers, and consumers being the least-informed groups. 
This originates in the fact that information about 
Information about the 
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C. Political Structure 
A third source of distortion is at the level of the politico-bureaucratic 
structure. 
signals by transforming the latent demand for innovations into an actual 
(budgeted) demand for innovations. In practice, however, the state is a 
highly complex institution that is motivated by a whole spectrum of forces 
that only indirectly reflect market forces and many times not at all. 
in particular, distinguish two contrasting patterns of state behavior. 
According to neoclassical ideals, the state should react to market 
We can, 
a. 
The state is an institution which benefits from a certain degree of 
The State Acting From Above 
autonomy relative to civil society. This autonomy is clearly constrained by 
both economic and political forces. Economically, the state needs to generate 
its resources from within civil society and, hence, is committed to reproduc- 
ing the surplus generation capacity of civil society, part of which it can 
appropriate via taxes and loans. 
surplus generation and, hence, dependent on surplus being generated in civil 
society. The result, in terms of state behavior, is that it is committed to 
surplus generation in civil society and, consequently, will be drawn into 
making policies that promote capital accumulation and surplus growth. Politi- 
cally, the state needs to legitimize itself which implies maintaining a clien- 
tele in civil society, making the necessary concessions to organized groups, 
and opening channels of communication with them but at the same time actively 
controlling and possibly suppressing the emergence of antagonistic pressure 
groups. 
The state is largely excluded from direct 
This relative autonomy of the state can fundamentally be used for two con- 
One is to act as an "ideal collective capitalist" in insur- trasted projects. 
ing both the conditions for capital accumulation in civil society and the 
reproduction of the existing social order. 
of the Keynesian state, for example, which uses fiscal and monetary policies 
to counter cyclical downturns in capital accumulation. 
a state which promotes particular technological advances in agriculture to 
overcome inflationary pressures, deficits in the balance of payments, or  in- 
security in food supplies. The type of state intervention and the choice of 
instruments will depend upon whether the state acts in anticipation of eco- 
nomic crises in what can be called a "planning mode" of action or if it acts 
in reaction to an ongoing crisis in what can be labeled a "crisis mode." The 
two modes of response are significantly different, for instance, in terms of 
using agricultural technological innovations as an element of crisis re- 
sponse. Since technological innovations require a fairly long-run maturation 
period, technology can hardly be used as a policy instrument if the state 
basically acts in a crisis-response mode. In this case, other more immediate 
policy instruments will be chosen such as price controls or trade policies. 
This reformist project is typical 
It is also typical of 
The second project is for the state to use its relative autonomy to pro- 
mote structural change on behalf of dominated classes in what has been called 
"revolutions from above" (Trimberger). Typical of these state projects 
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.is the role of the military and bureaucrats in promoting modernization in cer- 
tain phases of the history of Japan, Turkey, Egypt, Peru, and Mexico. In this 
case, the political elites are the agents of change, and the result can be 
drastic structural changes in civil society. This is typical of intermediate 
regimes in periods of transition between economic systems where the old domi- 
nant classes are in economic or political disarray, and the state can emerge 
as a powerful force in structuring the emerging social order. 
Thus "acting from above," the state can dramatically alter the transforma- 
tion of a latent demand for technological innovations into an actual demand. 
Key here are (1) whether the state acts with reformist or structural change 
objectives, (2) whether it acts in a planning mode or a crisis response mode, 
and (3)  how restrictive are the economic and legitimacy limits on state 
initiatives. 
When the state acts with reformist or structural change objectives and 
when the economic and political limitations on state initiative do not re- 
strict these objectives, the latent demand for generation of agricultural 
technology is likely to be translated into actual demand and generous budget 
allocations to agricultural research. By contrast to this planning mode, in 
crisis periods the state will face a "hard" budget constraint and its capacity 
to invest in the future will be reduced. 
likely to be translated into actual demand. 
projects, a planning mode corresponds to a low value of the discount rate, and 
a crisis mode corresponds to a high value of the discount rate used to compute 
the present value of benefits from agricultural research. 
Therefore, latent demand is less 
In terms of evaluation of public 
b. The State Activated From Below 
While the state can act with a certain degree of autonomy relative to 
civil society, it is also appropriated by interest groups which use it as both 
an object and an instrument of competition--an object in that organized groups 
compete to control the policymaking capacity of the state and an instrument in 
that differential appropriation of the benefits of policy (under the form of 
institutional rents) is an important element of the outcome of competition. 
The key issue here is that the state allocates resources and rents by non- 
market mechanisms and in response to the social pressure system, the electoral 
and bureaucratic reward systems, and the mechanisms of budget appropriations. 
Since, here, markets do not work, inequality in the distribution of assets and 
uneven distribution of economic and political power are keys in explaining 
state behavior. The course of agricultural technology can thus be powerfully 
influenced by organized lobbies, both on the side of producers and of con- 
sumers and employers. The key in understanding how state activation from be- 
low affects the rate and bias of technological change are (1) the degree of 
organization and the relative strength of different social groups; (2) the 
extent of cohesiveness or  balkanization of the state itself, the latter 
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allowing greater  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  f o r  pa r t i cu la r  i n t e r e s t  groups t o  capture  the  
state from below; and ( 3 )  the degree of r e l a t ive  autonomy of the state (and, 
hence, the stringency of economic and legitimacy cons t r a in t s  on the s t a t e )  
which makes it more o r  less immune t o  i n t e re s t  group danands. 
D. I n s t i t u t ions  Producinrr Innovations 
Finally,  a fourth source of d i s to r t ion  i n  the determination of the rate 
and b ias  of technological change is the way the  innovation-producing i n s t i t u -  
t i ons  transform the ac tua l  demand f o r  innovations i n t o  an ac tua l  supply. The 
main i s sue  here is  tha t  of the  degree of "articulation" between denand and 
supply (Pineiro and Trigo) i n  the choice of research p r i o r i t i e s  within re- 
search in s t i t u t ions .2  While the t o t a l  l eve l  of research a c t i v i t y  i n  these 
i n s t i t u t i o n s  i s  la rge ly  determined by budget appropriations (actual  danand) , 
they generally enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy i n  deciding the budget 
use among research a l t e rna t ives .  Research i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  l i k e  other agencies 
of the state, are a lso  in t e rna l ly  divided along l i n e s  which do not necessar i ly  
correspond t o  d iv is ions  i n  c i v i l  society,  resu l t ing  i n  a t h i r d  pa t t e rn  of 
state behavior (beyond the state acting from above and the state activated 
from below) which can be c a l l e d  the  s t a t e  act ivated "from within." The re- 
sponse of research s c i e n t i s t s  and administrators represents a cri t ical  l i n k  i n  
the  inducement mechanism. Within the  state and pa ras t a t a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  car ry-  
ing out research, the key issues are those of decentral izat ion of decis ion 
making and of pa r t i c ipa t ion  by in te res ted  p a r t i e s  i n  the  de f in i t i on  of re- 
search p r i o r i t i e s .  Decentralization a d  pa r t i c ipa t ion  are pa r t i cu la r ly  
important i f  research i s  going t o  address the  problems of small farmers who 
generally operate under highly complex and heterogenous circunstances with 
minimal i n s t i t u t iona l i zed  representation. 
by r u r a l  development advocates f o r  par t ic ipa t ive  research, farming systems 
approaches, and Yarmer f i r s t  and last" models (Chambers). 
T h i s  problem has led t o  proposals 
Also relevant a s  pa r t  of t h i s  fourth source of d i s to r t ions  i n  rate and 
b i a s  are the ro le  of in te rna t iona l  t r ans fe r s  of technology, t he  complemen- 
t a r i t y  between public and p r iva t e  research, and the flow of in te rna t iona l  a id  
t o  ag r i cu l tu ra l  research in s t i t u t ions .  Internat ional  t r ans fe r s  occur unevenly 
across crops, regions, and farms and transpose technologies with eventually 
optimum biases  f o r  the  context where they have been developed but not f o r  t h a t  
where transferred.  
t i o n a l  agribusiness as  a vector of technology t r ans fe r  t o  the t h i r d  world 
comes about. 
nological change and a source of exogenously determined d i s to r t ions  which have 
of ten  had highly soc ia l ly  disrupt ive consequences. 
This i s  where the whole question of the ro l e  of in te rna-  
These i n s t i t u t i o n s  are simultaneously a dynamic source of tech- 
Complenentarity between publ ic  and pr iva te  research is important because 
c e r t a i n  research areas cannot eas i ly  be carr ied out by pr iva te  research. 
i s  the  case f o r  fundamental research as w e l l  as research with long-term pay- 
o f f s ,  subs tan t ia l  external  e f f ec t s ,  and r e s u l t s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  patent.  Because 
of complanentarity i n  research, underinvestment and i n s t a b i l i t y  i n  publ ic  re- 
search furding can lead t o  bottlenecks on investment i n  p r iva t e  research 
e f f o r t s .  
This 
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Finally, international aid has been a major source of funding and support 
of national research initiatives. 
tinuity over time, and its priorities are thus also important in determining 
the rate and bias of the actual supply of innovations. 
The level of international aid, its con- 
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SECTION 3 
SIZE OF ?HE RESEARCH EFFORT: "E FACTS 
3.1. Histor ical  Overview 
Pr ior  t o  1950, the developing countries had s igni f icant  research programs 
aimed a t  the  improvement of co lonia l  t rade crops such as sugar, tea, cof fee ,  
cocoa, and cot ton along with a few small programs on rice and wheat. No s i g -  
n i f i can t  research on root crops, oilseeds,  pulses ,  sorghum, millets, and feed 
grains  was undertaken. 
In  the 1950s and ear ly  1960s, which was a period of decolonization and 
independence f o r  many count r ies  of Asia and Africa, high p r i o r i t y  was given t o  
indus t r i a l  growth and t o  import-substi tution po l i c i e s  while the ag r i cu l tu ra l  
sector  was re l a t ive ly  neglected. Research on food crops was not given p r i -  
o r i t y  (Evenson, 1984, p. 357). Of the t o t a l  investment i n  ag r i cu l tu ra l  re- 
search i n  1958, about 90 percent was i n  developed count r ies  and only 10 per-  
cent i n  developing countries.  
necessary €or  the provision of cheap food t o  the  increasingly urbanized popu- 
l a t i o n  was only a f r ac t ion  of that percentage. 
During the  1950s and 1960s, a nunber of research i n s t i t u t i o n s  were b u i l t  
i n  the developing world on the model of the U. S. f ede ra l - s t a t e  system, 
usual ly  with in te rna t iona l  support. Internat ional  a id  financed the t ra in ing  
of ag r i cu l tu ra l  s c i e n t i s t s  and i n s t i t u t i o n a l  buildup, but many nat ional  gov- 
ernments f a i l e d  t o  fund and develop research f a c i l i t i e s  and other support.3 
The proportion of research on food crops 
In response t o  that s i t u a t i o n  and following the successes of IRRI and 
C M T ,  the  in te rna t iona l  ag r i cu l tu ra l  research system was developed during 
the  1960s, culminating with the creat ion of the CGIAR i n  1971. These centers  
d i rec ted  t h e i r  a t t en t ion  t o  .a l imited nunber of crops and, given t h e i r  i n t e r -  
nat ional  mandate, placed emphasis on wide adaptab i l i ty  of the genetic 
material. A t  the  same time, nat ional  research cen te r s  were being transformed 
and developed. They were given an autonomous ro l e  and were d i s t i n c t  from 
t h e i r  predecessors which usual ly  were dependent on the  Ministries of Agricul- 
tu re  (Pineiro and Trigo, 1983, pp. 126 and 127). 
The i n i t i a l  success of in te rna t iona l  ag r i cu l tu ra l  research was grea t ,  
especial ly  i f  one considers that i n  1971 the IARCs accounted f o r  only 0.1 per- 
cent of t o t a l  expenditures f o r  agr icu l tura l  research. 
pp. 171-208) estimates that the technology derived from the work of the insti- 
tutes added $1 b i l l i o n  (U. S . )  i n  wheat and rice production i n  Asia alone 
during 1972-73. 
k l rymple  (1977, 
As the  new varieties spread in to  less-favored lands and as socioeconomic 
cons t r a in t s  t o  fu r the r  advances i n  productivity began t o  appear, progress 
slowed. 
might be declining as research moves i n t o  "second generation" technology i n  
wheat and rice. 
Evenson (1977, p. 261) suggests that the rate of re turn t o  investment 
-17- 
Moreover, progress has not been uniform. The return on investment i n  corn 
research at the IARCs has been realized more slowly than f o r  wheat and rice, 
although pr ivate  research on corn has been r e l a t ive ly  prof i tab le  (Arndt and 
Ruttan, 1977, p. 14). There i s  a great v a r i a b i l i t y  i n  return t o  research on 
spec i f ic  comnodities as the  work of Hertford and associates i n  Colombia has 
sbwn (Hertford et  a l . ,  1977, pp. 117-120). Rates of return f o r  research on 
soybeans and rice were found t o  exceed 50 percent. 
contrast ,  yielded returns tha t  were estimated t o  be negligible.  " h i s  l a t t e r  
f a c t  i s  surprising because co t ton  y i e ld  increases since the  ea r ly  1950s have 
been spectacular. 
search ac t iv i ty ,  involving loca l  t e s t ing  of va r i e t i e s  imported from the United 
S ta tes ,  appears t o  have been unnecessary because there were only minimal yield 
differences i n  those imported varieties and they could j u s t  as m l l  have been 
selected a t  random. 
example of a state involved i n  agr icu l tura l  research act ivated "from below'' by 
powerful in te res t  groups. 
i rdus t ry  i n  Colombia--until then, accustomed t o  importing U. S. cotton--found 
i t s e l f  compelled t o  buy Colombian cotton. 
sored the research program which, f o r  the most p a r t ,  involved the importation, 
l oca l  tes t ing ,  and d i s t r ibu t ion  t o  farmers of high-yielding varieties. 
Research on cot ton,  by 
Hertford's explanation of t h i s  puzzle is that the main r e -  
The cot ton research program of Colombia provides a good 
Mause  of a change i n  exchange r a t e ,  the t e x t i l e  
Tex t i l e  manufacturers then spon- 
Boyce and Evenson (1975, pp. 50 and 51) suggest tha t  40 percent t o  50 per -  
cent of the t o t a l  investment i n  agr icu l tura l  research i n  low-income countr ies  
derived from in te rna t iona l  a id  funds during the 1960s. By 1971, a id  was a t  a 
low and probably accounted f o r  less than 20 percent of the  nat ional  system 
investment. New fonns of funding--more complex than during t h e  1960s and in -  
volving a combination of public funds, in te rna t iona l  grants  and loans, and 
pa r t i c ipa t ion  of the pr iva te  sector--were devised (Trigo and Pineiro,  1984). 
During the 1970s and ear ly  1980s, it seems that foreign aid--although hard t o  
quantify exactly--accounted f o r  a larger  share, doubling i n  Latin America be- 
t w e n  1975 and 1980 (Oram, n.d., p. 7). 
most Latin American count r ies  around 1981 and the in te rna t iona l  recession have 
affected t h i s  trend. 
It is possible that the crisis i n  
The inception i n  1971 of the Consultative Group on Internat ional  Agricul- 
Originally established t o  help widen the bas is  of fund- 
t u r a l  Research (CGIAR) has introduced a new dimension i n  agr icu l tura l  research 
€or the th i rd  world. 
ing f o r  the four  ex is t ing  IARCs, it was then used t o  create new centers  t o  
meet special  needs, support nat ional  research e f f o r t s ,  and coordinate e f f o r t  
on an internat ional  basis. The CGIAR now has about 40 donors, mainly devel- 
oped countries,  multilateral organizations, the Ford Foundation and the 
Rockefeller Foundation, but a l s o  developing countr ies  which finance the 13 
in s t i t u t ions  that make up the CG network. 
The broad object ives  of the  system were defined by the Technical Advisory 
Committee (TAC) as follows: 
of food supplies i n  LDCs and meeting t o t a l  food needs; ( 2 )  meeting the 
nu t r i t i ona l  requirements of the less advantaged groups i n  the LDCs (Technical 
Advisory Comnittee Secre ta r ia t ,  1979) . 
(1) increasing the amount, qual i ty ,  and s t a b i l i t y  
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In the ea r ly  1970s, the CGIAR system had expanded considerably with a 
growth r a t e  i n  f inanc ia l  support of nearly 20 percent per year. 
1970s and 1980s, there  was a sharp level l ing off of expenditures and the sys- 
tan has hardly expanded during the 1980s with a growth r a t e  of only 1 percent 
per  year i n  real t e r n s  s ince 1980. 
t o  18.5 percent of donor funding of a l l  ag r i cu l tu ra l  research i n  the t h i r d  
world (Oram, p. 9). 
In the l a t e  
The 1980 leve l  of funding was equivalent 
More than 50 percent of the resources of the system go i n t o  plant breeding 
and related a c t i v i t i e s .  The other major research area is the  development of 
better systems of land and water management such as water conservation methods 
f o r  the semiarid t rup ics ,  s o i l  conservation pro jec ts ,  and farming systans.  
In the aftermath of the Green Revolution, a global ag r i cu l tu ra l  research 
system i s  merging (Ruttan, 1984). Strong linkages between the  various cm- 
ponents of the system have been established, pa r t i cu la r ly  between the in te rna-  
t i o n a l  n e t w r k  of IARCs and the national research systems. Pr ivate  research 
and pr iva te  funding of publ ic  pro jec ts  i s  increasing.4 The pr iva te  sector  
i s  becoming increasingly involved i n  ag r i cu l tu ra l  research i n  Latin America, 
more so according t o  Oram (p. 14) than i n  any other developing region. 
Agricultural  research, by i t s  very nature, i s  a long-term enterpr ise  that 
requires not only adequate leve ls  of investment but a l s o  a sustained inves t -  
ment program and qual i f ied  personnel over a period of years. Although there  
has been an  increase i n  research expenditures measured i n  constant d o l l a r s  
over the past 20 years o r  so as well as an increase i n  the qua l i ty  and quan- 
t i t y  of the s t a f f  of research in s t i t u t ions ,  there  i s  evidence of large year-  
to-year var ia t ions i n  the level of funding of research. 
a l s o  reveal t ha t  resources are highly unevenly a l loca ted  among crops and 
regions, with ce r t a in  crops receiving a disproportionate amount of funds, and 
countries--and regions within a country--being r e l a t ive ly  more favored than 
others . 
The avai lable  data  
The generation and d i f fus ion  t o  farmers of a flow of the new technology 
are considered by a l l  specialized agencies t o  be an  e s sen t i a l  component of the  
package of measures required f o r  the elimination of the food gap projected 
u n t i l  the  end of the  century (Food and Agriculture Organization, 1981, p. 77; 
World Bank, 1983, pp. 67-77; and Oram, Zapata, and Ray, 1979, p. 128). Most 
of t he  increase i n  ag r i cu l tu ra l  productivity w i l l  cane through la rger  and more 
e f f i c i e n t  investments i n  applied research and extension services  i n  developing 
countr ies .  The p o s s i b i l i t y  t ha t  it w i l l  come from sane dramatic advance i n  
basic research such a s  the  one that gave rise t o  the Green Revolution cannot 
be excluded but is unlikely i n  the  next two decades. 
Global research expenditures f o r  1984 are of the order of $10 b i l l i o n  
(U. S.) and involve about 200,000 s c i e n t i s t s .  About half  t ha t  amount and 
twice that personnel are invested i n  extension. 
only 2 percent of a l l  ag r i cu l tu ra l  research (and 15 percent of research expen- 
d i t u r e s  i n  less-developed count r ies  (LDCS). 
of foreign ass i s tance ,  the World Bank over the  pas t  decade has loaned $1.5 
b i l l i o n  (U. S . )  f o r  research support and $2 b i l l i o n  (U. S.) f o r  extension. 
The CGIAR system represents 
To f i x  ideas about the magnitude 
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The cost  of research per  s c i e n t i s t  per year is  $100,000 i n  industr ia l ized 
count r ies  and $60,000 i n  LDC which explains p a r t  of the  difference ( f o r  exten- 
s ion  services,  the difference is even more striking--$33,000 and $3,000). 
3.2. Level of Ebendi tures  i n  1980 
The pr inc ipa l  sources of data  on research expedi tures - - the  1981 
IFPRI/ISNAR study of Oram and Bindlish (OB), t he  1983 da ta  of Judd, Boyce, and 
Evenson (JBE) completing up t o  1980 the Boyce-Evenson da ta  (Buyce and Evenson, 
1975), and the  Trigo-Pineiro (1984) information f o r  1980 i n  Latin American 
countries--arrive at  very d i f fe ren t  estimates. The JBE estimates, the result 
of a survey based on questionnaires, are based on a broad de f in i t i on  of 
research expenditures. 
sector  research a d  "agricul tural ly  related'' s c i e n t i f i c  research. One would 
therefore expect the OB estimates (which do not include p r iva t e  research and 
define narrowly ag r i cu l tu ra l  research a c t i v i t i e s )  t o  be lower. 
They include public research and pr iva te  indus t r i a l  
In  f ac t ,  as should be clear from Table 3.1, this is f a r  from being the 
case. 
Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia, the Philippines,  etc., the OB f igures  are consider- 
ab ly  la rger  than the JBE data .  With the development of an  in te rna t iona l  net-  
work of research and the existence of such organizations as CGIAR, one would 
have expected more accuracy i n  the data  ( f o r  which times series covering a t  
least two decades e x i s t )  as the data  co l lec t ion  improves. The important d i s -  
crepancies r e f l e c t  the d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  measurement due t o  the f a c t  t ha t  ag r i -  
c u l t u r a l  research a c t i v i t i e s  are not easy t o  define with precision. 
international component--bilateral and mul t i l a t e ra l  aid--of the funding cannot 
be evaluated with accuracy because (1)  the disbursements gre of ten made for  a 
period of several  years  and ( 2 )  many development pro jec ts  have "research com- 
ponents" which are hard t o  separate  from the other  components of the p ro j -  
ects. Private  research (which the  OB da ta  presunably a n i t s )  i s  a l s o  hard t o  
quantify because of the var ie ty  of funding mechanisms ranging from contribu- 
t i o n s  t o  spec i f i c  publ ic  pro jec ts  t o  independent institutes set up by pro- 
dmers  ' associations.  
What i s  puzzling is t h a t ,  i n  many important cases such as Argentina, 
The 
3 .3 .  Growth Trend i n  Research Expenditures 
Real spending on research increased nearly fourfold (3.68) between 1959 
and 1980 but only by a f a c t o r  of 1 . 4  between 1970 and 1980 according t o  the  
B E  data. 
Boyce, and Evenson, 1983, p. 6) and do not include the IARCs expenditures. 
These data apply t o  national (public) research systems (Judd, 
According t o  the data  of Oram, the overa l l  annual rate of growth f o r  the 
pas t  decade wis 12.9 percent (Table 3.2). 
clear that most of the research e f f o r t  is st i l l  concentrated i n  developed 
countries.  But important changes have taken place since 1959. Asia, Latin 
America, and Europe are increasing i n  importance. The share of Asia almost 
doubled between 1959 and 1980, mainly because of the  expenditures of Japan and 
China--the lat ter having increased its research e f f o r t  almost tenfold i n  the 
pas t  20 years. 
doubled. 
Examining the  da ta  by region, it i s  
Europe's share increased s l i g h t l y  and Latin America's share 
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TABLE 3.1 
Comparison of Estimates of Expenditures on Agricultural Research 
in Developing Countries, 1980 
Country JBE data OB data PT data 
1 2 3 ~ 
thousands of dollars (U.  S . )  
Latin America 
Argentina 
Chile 
Paraguay 
Uruguay 
Bo1 ivia 
Braz i 1 
Colombia 
Ecuador 
Guyana 
Peru 
Venez uel a 
Barbados 
Costa Rica 
E l  Salvador 
Guatemala 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Jamaica 
Mexico 
Nicaragua 
Panama 
Trinidad /Tobago 
Dominican Republic 
Middle East 
Morocco 
Sudan 
Emt 
Tunisia 
Libya 
Cyprus 
Iran 
Israel 
Jordan 
Turkey 
Syria 
59,750 
11,319 
5,357 
3,821 
11,374 
174,012 
32,231 
6,100 
2,678 
8,163 
34,885 
65 2 
2,168 
2,391 
5,332 
452 
1,047 
935 
70,929 
2,211 
2,482 
709 
2,514 
8,026 
13,600 
23,717 
6,764 
2,793 
2,410 
45,163 
30,209 
849 
26,463 
4,963 
166,340 
10,353 
3,100 
4,174 
2,808 
245,000 
38,572 
6,436 
2,428 
8,912 
39,172 
767 
2,082 
4,974 
4,700 
a 
978 
772 
172,402 
1,999 
3,200 
2,515 
19,981 
14,634 
23,717 
6,764 
2,793 
2,411 
850 
34,426 
5,293 
152,410 
12,866 
6,547 
84 7 
3,292 
142,317 
2,610 
6,857 
419 
4,355 
39,171 
90 1 
2,083 
2,875 
5,785 
290 
979 
770 
66,155 
1,815 
2,255 
77 1 
2,336 
(Continued on next page. ) 
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TABLE 3.1--Continued. 
Country JBE data OB data PT data 
1 2 3 
thousands of dollars (U. S.1 
Africa 
Cameroon 
Chad 
Benin 
Gambia 
Gabon 
Ghana 
Ivory Coast 
Liberia 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Nigeria 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Upper Volta 
Zaire 
Bur und i 
Ethiopia 
Kenya 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mauritius 
Rwanda 
Tanz ani a 
Uganda 
Zambia 
Botswana 
Le sot ho 
Zimbabwe 
South Africa 
Swaz i land 
Asia 
Bangladesh 
Sri Lanka 
Nepal 
India 
Pakistan 
Indonesia 
Ma 1 ay s i a 
Ph i 1 i ppines 
Thailand 
China 
3,788 
1,602 
2,403 
66 
334 
12,655 
12,771 
394 
6,141 
284 
121,840 
9,726 
698 
1,105 
5,095 
3,608 
3,400 
22,712 
4,878 
5,660 
7,879 
94 5 
7,214 
7,452 
5,202 
465 
10,560 
64,519 
1,306 
4,977 
27,613 
5,057 
2,634 
120,167 
29,899 
33,200 
30,391 
9,533 
21,600 
643,555 
3,788 
1 , 602 
2,403 
10,095 
24,370 
394 
7,354 
284 
134,964 
9,797 
698 
1,105 
5 , 098 
3,610 
3 , 400 
24,052 
4,801 
4,562 
94 5 
7,219 
7,452 
5,205 
465 
10,560 
26,616 
4,342 
2,797 
154,781 
25,277 
44,485 
46,334 
16,254 
23,276 
aBlanks indicate data not available. 
Sources: Col. 1--Judd, Boyce, and Evenson, 1983; Col. 2--0ram and Bindlish, 
1981; Col. 3--Pineiro and Trigo, I S M ,  1984. 
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TABLE 3.2 
Growth Rates of A g r i c u l t u r a l  Expend i tu re s  and Scient i f ic  S taf f  
i n  Market Economies, 1970-80 ( p e r c e n t  compound p e r  annum). 
Ag. Research Expend i tu re s  Ag. Research S c i e n t i s t s  
1970-75 1975-80 1970-80 1970-75 1975-80 1970-80 
Asia ( e x c e p t  
Middle East and 
China)  (12)  
Middle East 
and North Africa 
( 9 )  
Sub-Saharan 
A f r i c a  ( e x c e p t  
South  Africa) (25) 
L a t i n  America (21)  
T o t a l  deve lop ing  
coun t r i e s  (67 1 
C G I A R  I n s t i t u t e s  
Western Europe (17)  
Canada, A u s t r a l i a ,  
N.Zealand, Japan  ( 4 )  
United S t a t e s  
Notes: 
F i g u r e s  i n  p a r e n t h e s i s  
5.4 6.3 5.9 
7.6 2.1 4.9 
11.8 8.9 10.4 
12.9 13.0 12.9 
9.6 9.4 9.5 
19.9 12.9 16.4 
3.6 5.8 4.7 
6.0 1.8 3.9 
1.6 2.4 2.0 
5.2 
1.1 
9.7 
4.5 
4.7 
NA 
3.5 
4.0 
0.0 
9.3 7.2 
8.7 4.8 
10.8 10.2 
7.5 6.0 
8.9 6.8 
NA NA 
4.8 4.2 
1.2 2.5 
1 .o 0.5 
i n  t h e  f i r s t  column i n d i c a t e  t h e  number of 
countries inc luded  (The 67 deve lop ing  count r ies  a r e  l i s t e d  i n  t a b l e  3.3). 
Source: 
The t a b l e  is t a k e n  from P. O r a m ,  I S N A R ,  n.d. 
Re fe rences  : 
Developing c o u n t r i e s :  Oram, P. & B i n d l i s h ,  V . ,  TFPRI/ISNAR, 1981, and 
more recent information c o l l e c t e d  by P. Oram 
C G I A R :  Second Review of t h e  C G I A R ,  November 1981. 
Western Europe: unpubl i shed  d a t a  from R. Evenson ( d a t a  a re  for 1968-74 
and 1974-80). 
United States:  Assessment of t h e  U.S. Food and A g r i c u l t u r a l  Research System, 
Congress  of t h e  United S t a t e s ,  Office of Technology Assessment, 1981. 
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Fixpenditure Shares, 1959 and 1980 
(percent of t o t a l  1 
Continent /Country 
&rope 
U&Rad Eastern Europe 
North America and Oceania 
Latin America 
Africa 
Asia 
( C h i n a )  
19 80 19 59 
13.3 20.2 
27.5 20.2 
36.9 23.3 
3.9 6.3 
5.8 5.7 
12.7 24.3 
(2.6) (8.7) 
-
Source: Judd, Boyce, and Evenson (1983). 
T h i s  changing pa t t e rn  and the d i f f e ren t  rates of growth by region r e f l e c t ,  
of course, d i f fe ren t  i n i t i a l  c o d i t i o n s ,  the unequal f inanc ia l  e f f o r t  of 
national systens,  and the f a c t  t ha t  the research tha t  was previously ca r r i ed  
out i n  developed countr ies  now tends t o  be localized i n  the countr ies  where 
most productivity gains  and increase i n  a rab le  land can take place. 
When research and extension expenditures are presented as a percentage of 
the agr icu l tura l  product, one observes tha t  the  relat ionship between more and 
less-developed countr ies  has not changed much. 
The more a f f luent  countr ies  tend t o  spend more on research and compara- 
t i ve ly  less on extension services  than low-income countries.  
v e l q i n g  countr ies  group, however, clear differences appear. The e f f o r t  of 
middle-inzome countr ies  and seni - indus t r ia l i  zed economies5 has increased 
s k r p l y  s ince 1959 while low-income countr ies  have increased research and ex-  
tension expenditures a t  a slower pace, measured i n  percentage of ag r i cu l tu ra l  
GDP. This could be a t t r i bu ted  t o  a l e s se r  research e f f o r t  o r  t o  a lower eco- 
nanic performance. 
Within the de- 
Research Expenditures 
( a s  percent of value of ag r i cu l tu ra l  product) 
bw-income countr ies  
19 59 
0.15 
- 197 0 
0.27 
198 0 
0.50 
-
Middle -income countr ies  0.29 0.57 0.81 
Seni - i d u s t r i a l i  zed economies 0.29 0.54 0.73 
Industrialized economies 0.68 1.37 1.50 
Planned economies (including China) 0.33 0.73 0.66 
Planned economies (except China) 0.45 0.75 0.73 
Extension w e n d i t u r e s  
(as  percent of value of agr icu l tura l  product) 
19 59 19 70 19 80 
bw-income countr ies  0.30 0.43 0.44 
Middle-income countr ies  0.60 1.01 0.92 
Seni-industrialized economies 0.29 0.51 0.59 
Industrialized economies 0.38 0.57 0.62 
Planned economies (including China) a 
Planned economies (except China) 0.29 0.33 0.36 
aBlanks ind ica te  data  not available.  
Source: Judd, Boyce, and Evenson (1983). 
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As Table 3 . 3  for 67 developing countries (from Oram, ISNAR) shows, no 
clear pattern is recognizable. 
of the country and GNP per capita (Oram n.d., and Ruttan, 1984). 
tionship between research expenditures and other economic variables is, in 
general, not significant. 
tries spent approximately 0.3  percent of their agricultural product in 1975, a 
decade ago. This is considerably below the estimates of Boyce and Evenson for 
1974 which are in most cases double or triple. 
is that Oram uses the agricultural GDP evaluated at current 1975 prices while 
Boyce and Evenson value agricultural GDP at 1971 prices. 
increase in agricultural prices between 1971 and 1974, the difference can be 
sizable (Pinstrup-Andersen, 1982, p.  75). 
Two explanatory factors have been cited: 
Oram (1978, 1979) estimated that developing coun- 
One reason for the disparity 
size 
The rela- 
Due to the sharp 
TAELE 3.3 
Agriruitural Research i n  57 Developing Countries, 1980. 
(ranked by percentage of t he i r  agr icul tural  CDP) 
Corrntry CNP per Ag. Res. Ag. Res. Growth r a t e  Number of Costs per 
capi ta  Exoend. a s  Z of of ag. CDP Sc ien t i s t s  Sc ien t i s t  
I %  per year) i n  1980 (US $) (US 3) (000 US$) ag.GDP 
1970-80 
EXPENDITURES OVER 1 PERCENT OF AC. CDP 
Panama 
Zlmbabwe 
Guyana 
Argentina 
Hexico 
Bar~ados 
Venezuela 
Mai i 
Senegal 
Kenya 
Brazil 
Cyprlrs  
1730 
630 
570 
2393 
2010 
1620 
3530 
190 
450 
420 
2050 
1520 
3203 
10553 
2428 
165340 
172402 
7b7 
39172 
7354 
9797 
24052 
245000 
2411 
5.33 
2.42 
1.85 
1.64 
1.36 
1.35 
1.32 
1.24 
1.21 
1.19 
1.15 
1.12 
1.9 
-0.5 
1 .o 
2.6 
2.3 
0.0 
3.8 
4.4 
3.7 
5.4 
4.9 
1.1 
Tot a1 /Mean 633483 
EXPENDITURES 6ETWEZN 0.5 A N D  1 PERCENT OF AC. CDP 
F i j i  1150 
Malaysia 1620 
Chiie 2150 
Elrrund i 230 
Zanbia 563 
Ivory Coast 1150 
Togo 410 
Malawi 230 
Nigeria 1010 
Colonbia 1 1  80 
:Iorocco 900 
Lesotho 420 
Papua N.C. 780 
Benin 310 
Uruguay 2810 
Sudan 410 
Chad 120 
Tunisia 1310 
E l  Saivador 660 
TotaiIMean 
2349 
46334 
10353 
36 10 
5205 
24370 
1892 
4562 
134964 
33572 
19781 
465 
5052 
2403 
4174 
14636 
1602 
6764 
4974 
332262 
0.88 NA 
0.82 5.1 
0.31 2.3 
0.81 1.8 
0.30 1.8 
0.78 3.4 
0.76 0.8 
0.75 4.1 
0.74 0.8 
0.54 4.9 
0.62 0.8 
0.60 2.9 
0.59 NA 
0.59 NA 
0.59 0.2 
0.57 2.6 
0.56 -0.3 
0.55 4.9 
0.50 2.8 
64 
20 1 
35 
1064 
1950 
23 
360 
68 
105 
400 
2957 
55 
7282 
22 
822 
28 1 
41 
109 
212 
49 
27 6 
1034 
333 
686 
14 
110 
19 
222 
164 
42 
285 
116 
4887 
50,000 
52,537 
69,371 
156,335 
88,411 
33,348 
108,811 
108,147 
93 304 
60,130 
82,854 
43,836 
93,860 
106,773 
56,367 
36,843 
08,049 
47,752 
176,594 
38,612 
16,529 
124,505 
115,832 
29,127 
33,214 
45,927 
126,474 
18,802 
89,244 
38,143 
23,733 
42,879 
67,990 
EXPENDITURES BETWEEN 0.25 AND 0.49 PERCENT OF AC. CDP 
Bangladesh 
Jordan 
Libya 
Pakistan 
Sri  Lanka 
Guatemala 
Madagascar 
Tanzania 
Eclrador 
Bolivia 
India 
Peru 
Turkey 
Burkina F. 
Paraguay 
Nicaragua 
Thailand 
Indonesia 
Egypt 
130 
580 
1420 
8640 
300 
270 
1080 
350 
280 
1270 
570 
240 
930 
1470 
274 
1300 
740 
670 
430 
26616 
23717 
850 
2794 
25277 
4342 
4700 
4801 
7219 
6436 
2808 
154781 
8912 
34426 
1105 
3100 
1999 
23276 
44485 
0.48 2.2 
0.45 2.7 
0.44 NA 
0.44 11.1 
0.41 2.3 
0.41 2.8 
0.39 4.6 
0.39 0.1 
0.35 4.9 
0.35 2.4 
0.34 3.1 
0.33 1.9 
0.33 NA 
0.23 3.4 
0.28 1.2 
0.28 5.9 
0.27 3.1 
0.26 4.7 
0.26 3.8 
TotalIHean 381743 
EXPENDITURES UNDER 0.25 PERCENT OF AC. CDP 
Costa Rica 1730 
Syria 1340 
Korea Rep. 1520 
Jamaica 1040 
Mauritania 440 
Sie r ra  Leone 280 
Nepal 140 
Cameroon 670 
Domln. Rep. 1160 
Philippines 690 
Zaire 220 
Rwanda 200 
Ethiopia 140 
Ghana 420 
Honduras 560 
Liberia 530 
Uganda 300 
2082 
5293 
29031 
772 
284 
698 
2797 
3788 
2515 
16254 
5098 
945 
3403 
10095 
978 
394 
7452 
Total/Hean 91876 
Source: P. Oram. ISNAR, n.d. 
0.24 
0.24 
0.23 
0.23 
0.22 
0.21 
0.20 
0.20 
0.20 
0.20 
0.20 
0.18 
0.18 
0.17 
0.16 
0.11 
0.08 
2.5 
8.2 
3.2 
0.7 
1.1 
2.2 
0.5 
3.8 
3.1 
4.9 
1.2 
NA 
0.7 
-1.2 
1.5 
4.7 
-0.9 
1642 
2724 
35 
123 
422 
158 
68 
256 
276 
114 
7103 
269 
937 
123 
63 
63 
1525 
1473 
20208 
2834 
75 
172 
960 
40 
8 
35 
226 
106 
99 
1050 
97 
24 
155 
352 
60 
20 
175 
3654 
16,210 
8,707 
24,286 
22,707 
8,919 
10,289 
29,747 
71,779 
23,199 
23,319 
24,632 
21,791 
33,310 
36,741 
20,463 
40,256 
31,730 
15,263 
30,200 
18,890 
27,760 
30,778 
30,241 
19,300 
35.503 
19.943 
12,376 
35,735 
25,404 
15.490 
52,557 
39 1375 
21,935 
28,679 
16,300 
19,700 
42,583 
25,144 
Notes: 1. CNP per capi ta  and ag. CDP derived from World Bank data  
(World Development Report, 1982) and nationai data. 
2. Ag. research expenditures and sc i en t i s t s :  see references 
for  t ab le  3.2. 
3. Costs per s c i e n t i s t s  include a l l  research cos t s ,  not 
only sa l a r i e s .  
I 
h) 
v1 
I 
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SECTION 4 
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH PROJECTS 
From an economic perspective, the rate of technical change in agriculture 
depends on the level of investment in research. The internal rate of return 
(IRR) of a research project is the discount rate that equalizes benefits and 
costs of the project over its duration. 
that, as long as the IRR is greater than the opportunity cost of capital 
(OCC), it is profitable to increase the stock of knowledge by investing in 
research. 
The rule for optimal investment is 
Some authors, notably Ruttan, have argued on the basis of numerous studies 
estimating the rate of return to investment in agricultural research that 
there is underinvestment in agricultural research. 
lows. All studies measuring the productivity of research starting with thc 
path-breaking study of Griliches (1958) on hybrid corn come up with average 
rates of return to investment ranging between 30 percent and 60 percent per 
year (Table 4.1). 
ect, commodity, region, and methodology used for the evaluation. 
that average returns consistently exceed the OCC by a wide margin indicates 
that, as long as we are at a point on the marginal efficiency curve where the 
IRR exceeds the OCC, it is profitable to invest more in research. 
defines the opportunity cost--whether it is the rate of return to other types 
of agricultural investment; to conventional development projects such as road 
building, education, etc. (for which a 15 percent IRR is considered to be 
good); or simply the rate of interest in developing countries-there seems to 
be evidence that not enough resources are invested in research.6 
The argument runs as fol- 
The estimates vary greatly depending on the type of proj- 
But the fact 
However one 
The opponents of the underinvestment thesis have concentrated their 
criticisms on the methodology used to measure the IRR. 
stance, have pointed out that gross benefits were compared only to direct 
costs in most studies and that, if other costs of implementation were ac- 
counted for, estimated returns would be more comparable to those of infra- 
structure projects. 
usually is underreporting of the benefits of the project as important indirect 
benefits, such as spillover effects beyond the country, are usually not taken 
into account. 
Some authors, for in- 
As a counterargument, others have stated that there 
The estimation procedure of the rate of return to research7 involves 
three steps (Scobie, 1979): 
estimate the output-increasing effect of technological change, and (given the 
shift) compute the gross annual research benefit (GARB); (2 )  compute the costs 
of the project; and ( 3 )  estimate the social profitability of the investment by 
a discounted cash flow analysis of the costs and benefits over time (typi- 
cally, the internal rate of return is used as a measure of social return). 
(1) measure the shift in the supply curve to 
To measure the impact of the research-induced technical change on output, 
two methods are used: 
tion approach. 
either an "index number approach" or a production func- 
The nature of the innovation involved determines in 
TABLE 4.1 
Summary Studies o f  Agricultural Research Productivity TABLE 4 1 -Conf/nued 
Annual Internal 
Time Rate o f  Return 
Studv Countrv Commodi tv Period (%I 
Index Number: 
Griliches, 1958 
Griliches, 1958 
Peterson, 1967 
Evenson, 1969 
Barletta, 1970 
Barletta, 1970 
Ayer, 1970 
Schmitz and Seckltr, 
1970 
Ayer and Schuh, 1972 
Hines, 1972 
USA Hybrid corn 1940-1 955 
USA Hybrid sorghum 1940-1957 
USA Poultry 191 5-1 960 
South Africa Surgarcane 1945-1 962 
Mexico 
Mexico 
Brazil 
USA 
Brazil 
Peru 
Hayami and Akino, 1977 Japan 
Hayami and Akino, 1977 Japan 
Hertford, Ardila, Colombia 
Rocha, and Trujillo, 
1977 
Pee, 1977 Malaysia 
Peterson and USA 
Fitzharris, 1977 
Wennergren and Bolivia 
Whitaker, 1977 
Pray, 1978 Punjab 
(British 
India) 
Punjab 
(Pakistan) 
Scobie and Posada, 1978 Bolivia 
Pray, 1980 Bangladesh 
Regression Analysis: 
Griliches, 1964 USA 
Tang, 1963 Japan 
Wheat 1943-1 963 
Maize 1943-1 963 
Cotton 1924-1 967 
Tomato harvester, 1958-1 969 
with no 
compensation to  
displaced workers 
Tomato harvester, 
with compensation 
o f  displaced workers 
for 50% of  earnings 
loss 
Cotton 1924-1 967 
Maize 1954-1 967 
Rice 
Rice 
Rice 
Soy beans 
Wheat 
Cotton 
Rubber 
Aggregate 
Sheep 
Wheat 
Agricultural 
research and 
extension 
Agricultural 
research and 
extension 
Rice 
191 5-1 950 
1930-1 961 
1957-1972 
1960-1971 
1953-1973 
1953-1 972 
1932-1973 
1937-1 942 
1947-1952 
1957-1 962 
1957-1 972 
1966-1 975 
966-1 975 
906-1 956 
948-1 963 
957-1964 
Wheat and rice 1961-1977 
Aggregate 1880-1 938 
Aggregate 1949-1 959 
35-40 
20 
21-25 
40 
90 
35 
77+ 
37-46 
16-28 
77-1 10 
35-40a 
50-5Sb 
25-27 
73-75 
60-82 
79-96 
11-12 
none 
24 
50 
51 
49 
34 
44 
-48 
34-44 
23-37 
79-96 
30-35 
35 
35-40 
Latimer, 1964 USA Aggregate 1949-1959 not  significant 
source: Ruttan, pp. 242 and 243. 
Annual Internal 
Time Rate of Return 
Study Country Commodity Period (%I 
Peterson, 1967 
Evenson, 1968 
Evenson, 1969 
Barletta, 1970 
Duncan, 1972 
Evenson and J ha, 1973 
Cline, 1975 
(revised by Knutson 
and Tweeten, 1979) 
Bredahl and Peterson, 
1976 
Kahlon, Bal, Saxena, 
Evenson and Flores, 
and Jha, 1977 
1978 
Flores, Evenson, and 
Hayami, 1978 
Nagy and Furtan, 1978 
Davis. 1979 
Evenson, 1979 
USA Poultry 
USA Aggregate 
South Africa Sugarcane 
Mexico Crops 
Australia Pasture 
India Aggregate 
USA Aggregate 
Improvement 
Research and 
extension 
USA Cash grains 
Poultry 
Dairy 
Livestock 
India Aggregate 
Asia- Rice 
national 
Asia- 
International Rice 
Tropics Rice 
Philippines Rice 
Canada Rapeseed 
USA Aggregate 
USA 
USA 
USA 
USA 
Sou thern 
USA 
Northern 
USA 
Western 
USA 
USA 
Aggregate 
Technology 
oriented 
Science 
oriented 
Science 
oriented 
Technology 
oriented 
Technology 
oriented 
Technology 
oriented 
Farm management 
research and 
agricultural 
extension 
191 5-1 960 
1949-1 959 
1945-1 958 
1943-1 963 
1948-1 969 
1953-1971 
1939-1948 
1949-1 958 
1959-1968 
1969-1972 
1969 
1969 
1969 
1969 
1960-1961 
1950-196s 
1966-1975 
1966-197s 
1966-1975 
1966-1975 
1960-1975 
1949-1 959 
1964-1974 
1868-1926 
1927-1950 
1927-1950 
1948.1971 
1948-1971 
1948-1971 
1948-1971 
1948-1 97 1 
21 
47 
40 
45-93 
58-68 
41-50' 
40 
39-47c 
32-39' 
28-35' 
36d 
37d 
4 3d 
47d 
63 
I 
32-39 N 
73-78 7 
74-1 02 
46-71 
75 
95-1 10 
66-1 00 
37 
65 
95 
110 
4s 
130 
93 
95 
110 
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general the appropriate method. 
mate of average benefit from the whole project, is used when the source of 
technical change can be easily identified; it estimates the amount of re- 
sources saved by adopting modern varieties. This requires an assumption about 
yields that would have prevailed if the technology had not been adopted 
(usually using time series of yields of traditional varieties and simulating 
their time paths) and, as Scobie points out, depends heavily on the quality of 
the national data. 
returns to increased investment, measures by econometric methods the contribu- 
tion of inputs and of technical change to increased output. 
problems of errors in measurement and specification bias can lead to biased 
estimates of the technological contribution, but there is "no clear presump- 
tion concerning the direction of the bias" (Scobie, 1979, p. 3). 
The first approach, which produces an esti- 
The second approach, producing an estimate of marginal 
The classical 
Hertford and Schmitz point out that, regardless of the methodology em- 
ployed, accurate estimation of the change in production attributable to re- 
search is the most critical step in any effort to measure productivity of 
research. The standard approach measures the social surplus resulting from a 
shift in the supply curve due to the technical change. Jarrett and Lindner 
note that accurate surplus measures depend on the shape and level of supply 
and demand functions and that parameters valued at equilibrium are not neces- 
sarily representative. 
Bonig (1974) and Hertford and Schmitz (1977) note the necessity to use 
compensated demand curves to reduce the bias of surplus measures because un- 
compensated demand elasticities will tend to overestimate the benefits to con- 
sumers. 
Schuh (1972, 1974) there seems to be agreement that a unitary elasticity of 
demand curve is the relevant reference point to measure GARB (see Scobie, 
Following the evaluation of research on cotton in Brazil by Ayer and 
p. 5). 
The level and shape of the supply curve constitute another area of dis- 
agreement. Griliches (1958) and Schmitz and Seckler (1970) in their work on 
the California tomato harvester assume perfectly elastic supply curves. Ayer 
and Schuh (1972), by using experimental cotton yield gains rather than actual 
gains observed among farmers, actually overestimate the shift in supply re- 
sulting from innovations. Two types of shifts have been mostly considered in 
the literature: a Ipivotall' shift and a "parallel" shift. 
Jarrett (1978) and Rose (1980, p. 834) have analyzed the effect on the type of 
curve chosen and of the intercept estimate on the measurement of GARB. 
show that the estimates of GARB can vary sixfold depending on the nature of 
the shift. 
Lindner and 
They 
As Scobie (1979) notes, econometric estimation is generally rendered dif- 
ficult by the absence of observations for the estimation of the intercept. (Do 
farmers produce positive amounts if the price is zero?) 
of the curve is concerned, one possible assumption would be to postulate dif- 
ferent curves depending on the type of technical change and how it affects 
different groups of producers, for example, producers of upland - vs. irrigated 
rice (e.g., Scobie and Posada, 1978). 
As far as the shape 
Several important methodological problems concerning the measurement of 
benefits have been noted, particularly by Lindner and Jarrett (19781, Scobie 
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(19791, and Rose (1980). 
the new technology to be removed is calculated. But, as Scobie (p. 8) points 
out, other scenarios that might have prevailed in its absence are ignored. 
These omissions that are not taken into account in the measurement might very 
well dampen the bias and result in a net underestimation rather than over- 
estimation of the benefits. For example, would the government have permitted 
imports at the higher price implied by the absence of technological change, 
and would it have introduced retail price fixing or rationing in an attempt to 
evade the consequences of higher prices? (Scobie). 
In estimating GARB, typically the social loss were 
Introducing trade and price policies and government intervention in 
general into the model to be estimated might alter the results considerably. 
The strength of the original Griliches model was its simplicity. 
a closed economy, he ignored the potential foreign exchange that might be 
earned through technical innovations. 
ticity of demand of -1 and thereby abstracts from general-equilibrium and 
resource -adjustment problems. 
By assuming 
His model also assumes a price elas- 
Many of the studies listed in Table 4.1 have taken into account the pos- 
sible distortions introduced by government policies and trade policies as well 
as the general-equilibrium effects arising from changes in resource produc- 
tivity in one sector, thereby "freeing" resources that can be employed in 
other sectors. 
the distribution between producers of the benefits from research. 
They have in general done so in the context of an analysis of 
For export commodities, demand elasticities will tend to be quite high. 
This means that, even for large changes in the quantity supplied, there will 
be fairly small changes in price; most benefits will go to producers unless 
the government judges it necessary to intervene. 
though, could benefit indirectly because the additional foreign exchange 
generated by increased exports can help finance a higher rate of growth. This 
sequence was pointed out by Castro and %huh in their study of Brazil. Of the 
commodities included in the study, two (sugarcane and cotton) were traditional 
exports; another two were staple foods (beans and manioc). 
Some consumer groups, 
kino and Hayami (19751, in their study of the rice-breeding program of 
Japan, concluded that in the absence of trade producers would have been net 
losers from agricultural research. 
a net importer of rice.) Evenson, Flores, and Hayami (19771, analyzing the 
rice program in the Philippines, have shown how imports have been used to 
maintain a stable price for consumers with sufficient rice imports to maintain 
a target domestic price. 
(During the period under study, Japan was 
In his famous paper on the returns to poultry research in the United 
States, Peterson (1967) takes general-equilibrium effects into consideration. 
The reduction in output if the new technology is withdrawn causes a reduction 
in net $cia1 benefits. 
moving out of that sector, a fact that should be subtracted from the estimate 
of net social benefits measured in the partial-equilibrium framework. 
and Seckler (1970) proceed in a similar way in their analysis of the mechani- 
cal tomato harvester. They subtract from the benefits of the research on the 
harvester the returns foregone by farm workers who would have been employed 
But there is also a net gain because resources are 
Schmitz 
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were it not for technical change. 
noted, this procedure amounts to taking into account the adjustment costs 
associated with the technological change. 
As Schuh and Tollini (1978, p. 33) have 
As these examples from the literature demonstrate, the theory is well de- 
On the cost side, three problems 
First, it has been argued that 
veloped on the benefit side; the accuracy of the estimates depends only on the 
availability of data in each relevant case. 
seem to be of major concern for most authors. 
spillover effects originating in the public good character of the product of 
the research have not been internalized. For example, should part of the cost 
of the IRRI program be charged against the benefits of high-yielding varieties 
in Colombia or in the Philippines; does the fact that the IRRI is located in 
the Philippines explain why that country spent less than 0.25 percent of its 
agricultural product on research (Table 3 . 3 . ) ?  A second issue, raised by 
Dalrymple among others, is that of adoption and associated costs. 
benefit accounting, not only should the direct costs of the research program 
be entered against the benefits but, also, the costs of diffusion and assimi- 
lation by farmers of the new technology should be entered. Some authors have 
failed to do this and, therefore, have underestimated the costs of the pro- 
gram. 
for lack of precise data, some costs might inevitably escape even a careful 
accounting. The third issue, already raised in the context of the evaluation 
of benefits, is that of price distortions. Do the costs of the inputs used 
reflect their true social scarcity value? For example, during the past de- 
cade, the price of chemical inputs (fertilizers, etc.) in developing countries 
was distorted by exchange rate policies and other measures aimed toward pro- 
tecting the agricultural sector from the consequences of oil price increases. 
In cost- 
In general, either because of the diverse nature of indirect costs or 
Finally, in the context of our brief review of the methodology of evalua- 
tion of the project, it is important to mention the measurement bias that 
might exist because of an underestimation of the investment and adoption 
period. First, as Griliches (1957) had noted, not only should the lag in 
availability of technology be accounted for in the econometric estimation but 
the adoption lag should also be taken into account. 
correct measurement of depreciation costs during the investment period. As 
Scobie has pointed out (p. 91, because the lags are generally long in agricul- 
tural research, it can be argued that errors in GARB are damped rather than 
amplified by the fact that with high rates of returns (such as those reported 
in most studies) errors in future benefit streams are heavily discounted and 
more than offset the underreported costs. 
A second problem is the 
In conclusion, none of the issues of methodology mentioned here seems to 
disprove the underinvestment hypothesis. Clearly, as we have seen, severe 
measurement problems exist at every step of the evaluation procedure. Al- 
though the accuracy of the estimates might be legitimately in doubt for the 
earlier studies, with the degree of sophistication displayed in the more re- 
cent studies incorporating earlier criticisms it is likely that the results 
actually underestimate rather overestimate returns to agricultural research. 
As we have seen from a methodological point of view, nothing presumes the 
direction that the estimation bias will take--neither optimism nor pessimism 
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is justified. 
cated enough to take into account all of the relevant effects. To a great 
extent, the quality of the data will determine the results. 
that the average returns observed in many studies are too high. 
exists a research production function with diminishing returns to marginal 
increments of investment, one wonders if IRRs ranging between 30 percent and 
60 percent conceal marginal rates of returns so low that they would not 
justify more investment in agricultural research. 
All that one can hope for is that the model will be sophisti- 
It is possible 
But if there 
Pasour and Johnson (1982) have questioned the validity of ex post evalua- 
tions to measure potential returns. 
that a particular investment performed well relative to the market average (a 
high ex post return) does not imply that it will be a good investment in the 
future (a high ex ante return). 
agricultural research because the (environmental, social, and institutional) 
conditions in which the innovation process takes place are crucial to the suc- 
cess of the project. 
adapted to different regions or countries yield very different adoption 
rates. To conclude that there is underinvestment requires proof that the rate 
of investment in the current period is too slow and to use the term 
"underinvestment"--implying that the rate of investment is too slow--requires 
a normative judgment. 'The economist cannot determine underinvestment or in- 
efficiency by decision-makers in either the public or private sector--he can 
only provide information about past economic conditions" (Pasour and Johnson, 
1982). Such a statement does not l'provell that the present level of investment 
is optimal or that investment opportunities in agricultural research have been 
exhausted; it merely shifts the debate from the positive to the normative ter- 
rain. Clearly, policy choices have to be made; but this does not disprove the 
point made by Ruttan and others that there is an economic rationale in making 
the choice of investing in research as long as there is evidence of high 
returns. 
Their argument runs as follows. 
This is particularly true in the case of 
The fact 
This explains why, for example, the same varieties 
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SECTION 5 
UNDER1NVES"T IN AGRIUJLTURAL RESEARCH 
Plotting rates of return against investment-in-research data results in an 
unintelligible scatter of points. 
search in agriculture make a case for the underinvestment thesis, but they do 
not explain why investment in research activities is so low. 
little about the policy choices involved in research-resource allocation, why 
there is investment in certain types of crops and/or types of innovations and 
why others are neglected, and why some research projects are successes and 
others failures. 
Studies examining the productivity of re- 
They say very 
The studies show that investment in agricultural research yields very high 
rates of return. 
10 percent to a 100 percent annual internal rate of return. 
tend to analyze projects involving specific innovations in specific areas or 
crops. Failures are seldom documented. Behind these data are price/quantity 
relationships and institutional processes involving supply and demand curves 
and their interactions which generate those points. 
returns observed in the studies can only be explained by identifying the vari- 
ables determining demand and supply functions of research. 
They exhibit a great variance in returns ranging from a 
Finally, they 
The great variance in 
In this section we examine some of these variables and put forward some 
political-economic arguments that explain the low rate of investment in re- 
search. 
between private- and public-sector research in agriculture which has been a 
continuing area of concern and controversy. 
sector in agricultural research in both developed and developing countries has 
been justified on three grounds: 
sumers should receive all the benefits from research, and spillover benefits 
from research create externalities that require government finance to inter- 
nalize. 
for convenience. 
Before examining these arguments, we will comment on the boundary 
Participation of the public 
research results are a public good, con- 
Although they are related, we will examine these issues separately 
Neoclassical theory takes into account the possibility of market failure. 
The failure of markets to exist arises, for instance, because of the impossi- 
bility of excluding nonbuyers from the use of the product. 
pricing might be impossible or may require the use of considerable resources. 
In general, market failure occurs because transaction costs (including exclu- 
sion costs, information costs, etc.) which are attached to any market and in- 
deed to any mode of resource allocation are so high that the existence of the 
market is no longer worthwhile. "The difference between transaction costs and 
production costs is that the former can be varied by a change in the mode of 
resource allocation while the latter depends only on technology and tastes and 
would be the same in all economic systems" [Arrow (1970), p. 6811. 
Markets are the predominant form of social arrangement to allocate re- 
In this case, 
sources in a capitalist society, but they are not the only mode of resource 
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allocation. One of the advantages of the price system over political bargain- 
ing or over planned allocation is usually stated to be the economy in costs of 
transaction; but in some cases such as usage of irrigation, the costs of 
transmitting and receiving a large number of price signals are very high, and 
there is a tendency not to differentiate prices as much as would be desirable 
from an efficiency point of view. In a price system, transaction costs drive 
a wedge between buyer's and seller's prices and thereby give rise to welfare 
losses. Removal of these losses can be achieved by switching t o  another mode 
of resource allocation such as allocation by the state on the basis of 
benefit-cost criteria. O f  course, the advantages of such a mode of allocation 
compared to the market system must be weighed against a possible increase in 
transaction costs which could result, for example, in the case of agricultural 
research in the need for studies to determine demand functions without the 
benefit of observing a market. 
Market failures are one of the reasons why the state has a special role to 
play in resource allocation. Given high transaction costs or given the exist- 
ence of Pareto inefficiency in a free-market equilibrium, there is pressure to 
overcome it by some form of departure from the the free market, i.e., some 
form of collective action; but, other reasons have also motivated the state to 
intervene in the economy. Because of its relative autonomy, it was able in 
specific instances to effectuate important structural changes in agriculture-- 
through land reform and investment programs--against the will of the dominant 
classes in society basing its action on efficiency or equity considerations. 
The state, historically, has played a privileged role in replacing the market 
for allocating resources because it has the coercive power (and, in some 
cases, the legitimacy) required to economize on transaction costs. 
tion for the failure of the market. Institutions, such as producers' associa- 
tions and other types of coalitions, can organize themselves in order to 
internalize the externalities created by the process of production of re- 
search. In Section 3 we have seen, for example, that the association of 
textile producers of Colombia has financed research on cotton in that country, 
thus, appropriating most of the benefits of the operation. 
The state is not the only social institution which can serve as compensa- 
The spillover argument addresses the issue of externalities that are pre- 
sent in most research projects. 
congruence between costs and benefits of agricultural research. 
certain domains, such as improved varieties, can be expected to have an impact 
on productivity growth in agriculture for others than those who have borne the 
costs. Therefore, some mechanism is required to internalize the externalities 
and, thus, improve efficiency. 
Spillover effects result from the lack of 
Research in 
Another dimension of spillover effects is the transfer of gains from pro- 
ducers to consumers (Ruttan, 1982, p. 2 5 7 ) .  The way in which the gains from 
technical change are partitioned between producers and consumers of a particu- 
lar commodity depends on the slopes of the demand and supply curves for the 
product and on the rate of technical change and of demand change, i.e., that 
rate at which the two curves shift to the right over time. If the product is 
characterized by highly elastic demand and/or by rapid growth in demand, such 
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as for most export crops, producers are able to retain large gains from tech- 
nical change. 
growth in demand is slow, as is the case for many food crops consumed by the 
poor in developing countries, most of the gains from technical change are 
passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices if no intervention, such as 
price support programs for farmers, takes place. The treadmill mechanism 
limits the economic motivation of farmers for support of agricultural research 
to a small population of early adopters of the new technology. The early 
adopters also tend to be the most influential and politically articulate. As 
Ruttan (1982, ibid.) points out, it may explain why agricultural research has 
not been able to achieve as broad a base among the farm population as support 
for commodity price programs. 
By contrast, if demand is inelastic and/or if the rate of 
Some authors have objected to public agricultural research on the grounds 
that centralization of decision making at the level of the state creates in- 
efficiencies. 
respond with a nonmarkef-failure argument (see Pasour and Johnson, 1982); but 
the centralization argument is historically incorrect in the case of agricul- 
tural research. 
Latin American research institutions and shown that, as a response to the 
problems associated with centralized research under the aegis of the minis- 
tries of agriculture, decentralized and autonomous institutions emerged during 
the 1960s in most Latin American countries. 
To the structuralist market-failure argument, these authors 
Pineiro and Trigo (1983) have documented the evolution of 
Other authors have expressed doubt about the public-good nature of re- 
search. They argue that a large proportion of new technology has been in the 
form of improved seeds, machinery, chemicals, etc., rather than "information" 
(such as farming practices) which has a public-good element. 
tion, say, about planting density, which may appear to have a public-good 
character, in fact, must be modified and adapted to individual microecological 
circumstances on each farm (Grant Scobie, personal communication). 
agricultural technology is actually a public good is highly relevant for a 
policy debate if one considers that the state should intervene in the financ- 
ing and conduct of the research process only in cases where private initiative 
fails. 
Even informa- 
Whether 
There are two distinct aspects to the question of what is the appropriate 
boundary between public and private research. 
search benefits are not appropriable by the private sector and where market 
mechanisms or private coalitions fail to produce research (market failure), 
public intervention is required. 
instances where benefits are not appropriable because private transaction 
costs are too high. In such uncontroversial instances, most authors agree 
that public financing is in order and that the state should have a role in 
determining research priorities. This would be, for instance, the case of 
basic scientific research; but in those situations where private mechanisms of 
appropriation can be devised, the question becomes: Should the private sector 
appropriate all the benefits from research? 
cause one considers, for  example, that the state should use the surplus to 
finance development projects), how should the surplus be distributed? 
In some instances where re- 
The private sector will neglect research in 
If the answer is negative (be- 
In 
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practice, the answer given to this question depends largely on the nature of 
the state and of its relationship with various groups in civil society. 
Such difficult questions can only be answered on a case-by-case basis 
based on an ex ante evaluation. Some general principles, though, can be de- 
rived from already existing studies. 
the effect of displacing labor and do not profit society at large. 
financing of such cost-saving but not ouput-increasing innovations should be 
left to the private sector. Binswanger, for instance, in his study of trac- 
torization in South Asia (1980, p. 73) concluded that "the tractor surveys 
fail to provide evidence that tractors are responsible for substantial in- 
creases in intensity, yields, timeliness, and gross returns on farms in India, 
Pakistan, and Nepal. Such benefits may exist but are so small that they can- 
not be detected and statistically supported even with massive survey research 
efforts. This is in sharp contrast to new varieties or irrigation where any- 
body would be surprised if he failed to find statistically significant yield 
effects, even in fairly moderate survey efforts." Biological innovations are 
beneficial to larger groups in society than mechanical innovations, and the 
problem then becomes to devise mechanisms to make beneficiaries pay for the 
research according to their share of benefits via taxation or other public 
allocation schemes. 
Innovations in mechanization have mostly 
Therefore, 
The growing importance of the private sector in the process of technical 
innovat ion, including the role of transnational corporations and national 
farmer associations, and the decentralization of national research systems are 
the most important features of the global research system that has emerged in 
recent years. 
search backed by international support. The momentum was provided by the 
early successes of IRRI and C M Y T .  But as technology moved into the "second 
generation'' phase, latent problems began to appear; there were signs that the 
institutions built during the 1960s were facing a crisis because they were not 
adapting to new developments taking place in the economies of Latin America. 
During the 1960s, there was strong expansion in national re- 
Before the Second World War, institutional change in agricultural research 
was induced in response to specific crises such as a cotton crisis in Canete, 
Peru, an outbreak of sugarcane mosaic disease in Palmira, Colombia, and 
changes in export markets (cacao and rubber) as a result of the war in Ecuador 
(Trigo, Pineiro, and Sabato). 
During the 195Os, as a result of the process of import-substituting in- 
dustrialization (ISI) which induced changes in the structure of demand for 
food because of population growth and urbanization, there was increasing 
awareness of the importance of agricultural technology and of institutional 
changes to modernize agriculture and counteract the trend of stagnation of the 
agricultural sector that was generating balance-of-payments problems and 
domestic excess demand. 
The agricultural sectors of Latin America were transformed by a set of 
interrelated reforms: 
agrarian reforms; (2 )  increasing use of agroindustrial inputs, which implied a 
change in orientation in the development of agriculture and, as such, was 
(1) changes in the production structure through 
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resisted at first by several social groups but in time led to the appearance 
of new agrarian interest groups; and (3)  institutional changes in research and 
technology. During this period, Latin American states acting "from above" 
assumed responsibility for technological change. Autonomous semipublic insti- 
tutions were set up in many countries (INTA in Argentina in 1957, INIAP in 
Ecuador in 1959, FONAIAP in Venezuela in 1959, INIA in Mexico in 1960, SIPA in 
Peru, ICA in Colombia, INIA in Chile, et'c.). The basic model around which 
these institutes were constructed was that of a technological converter to 
facilitate the adoption and dissemination of the technologies available at the 
international level (see Trigo, Pineiro, and Sabato, p. 132). 
institutes were based on the concept of broad adaptability (encompassing a 
wide range of regions and types of farms) for major crops. 
The national 
5.1. Political-Economic Dimension of the Demand for Research 
At the beginning of the 1970s it became clear that the available technolo- 
gies on which the modernization strategy was based were quite successful in 
some cases but were not neutral in their effects on production and in their 
social impact. 
Public research policy when the state is in the "planning mode" can be 
viewed as a process of "explicitly creating the demand for research of certain 
types rather than simply responding to existing demand through estimates of 
market forces and their effects" (Mellor, p. 479). The case studies analyzed 
by Trigo and Pineiro show the successes of strategies in which the government, 
in response to stagnation in production or foreign exchange shortages, pushes 
for a negotiated solution and mediates the interests of industrial urban clas- 
ses with more specific interests of farmers' groups (rice in Colombia or maize 
in Argentina). 
articulate the demand for new technology originating from various groups, 
which appears in an ex ante evaluation to be in the interests of the society 
at large, and to produce a "package" of policies combining adaptation of im- 
proved varieties available internationally to local conditions with economic 
policies protecting specific groups from the effects of technical change 
(price stabilization, subsidies, and protectionism). These processes of 
"articulation" presuppose that the state must be strong enough, once the need 
for the society as a whole to increase production is recognized, to implement 
public policies consistent with "progress" and technical change. 
In these cases, the state, acting from above, is able to 
In other types of successful technological processes, the social articula- 
tion was generated from within the agricultural sector. The examples of sugar 
in Colombia and milk production in the Ecuadorian highlands show that, when it 
takes the initiative, the agrarian sector acquires considerable influence and 
participation in the institutional mechanisms. In these cases, specific 
social classes were able to negotiate with the government on a series of poli- 
cies (price policies, credit, etc.) that served their specific interests and 
activated the state "from below." The economic policies implemented were in 
all cases designed to solve particular problems obstructing the development of 
the productive sector. 
change controlled the sector and were able to appropriate a good part of the 
benefits of technical change. Moreover, they created organizational mecha- 
nisms that gave them a certain amount of control over the supply of technology. 
The social groups that took the initiative in the 
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According to the findings of the PROTAAL studies, such processes of tech- 
nical change, although successful, had moderate effects on yields and resulted 
in considerable expansion of area. They resulted in important changes in work 
organization toward more concentration and vertical integration of produc- 
tion. By contrast, when the state mediated the interests of conflicting 
groups from above, the results were significant increases in production and 
yields and minor modifications of the work organization (see Pineiro and 
Trigo, 1983). 
There are also examples of relative failures resulting either in stagna- 
tion of the sector affected or in insignificant increases in yield but in ac- 
celerated social differentiation (e.g., potato production in the Mantaro 
Valley in Peru). 
process of technical innovation were not adequately designed or no existing 
social class linked to production was capable of mobilizing and coordinating 
government action in its favor. 
that are produced by the campesino sector (potatoes, beans, etc. 
specific regions. 
less-fertile regions or regions with reduced access t o  water; regional differ- 
ences are often correlated with class differences (see Scobie and Posada, 
p. 386). The difficulties of the poorest producers to mobilize research ef- 
forts in their favor may explain, for example, why upland, nonirrigated rice 
has received less attention than has irrigated rice. Concentrating research 
on the former "would presumably have entailed foregone benefits to the numer- 
ous urban poor without guaranteeing that small upland producers would have 
benefitted in the long run" (Scobie and Posada). 
In these examples, either public policies backing up the 
This remark applies particularly to the crops 
or by 
In Latin America the rural poor tend to be concentrated in 
These comments show that potential demand for research will be translated 
into actual demand either when some products are important for the state, 
which sees in the process of technical change a means of finding a solution to 
a specific agrarian problem (e.g., rice in Colombia), or when products are 
important for some specific groups and producers' associations capable of 
mobilizing the state which will then engineer the change in active collabora- 
tion with those groups. 
5.2 The Supply of Research and Its Determinants 
The rate of technical change is affected by the conditions under which 
institutions supplying research in agriculture operate. As explained above, 
from an institutional point of view, research efforts are mainly centered 
around the national research institutes organized in the 1960s, but one of the 
most significant recent trends is the growing participation of the private 
sector in some areas of research. 
The setting of priorities and allocation of resources of the national re- 
search institutes have been affected during the 1970s by changes in the 
national and international context in which they operate. 
model adapted from the U. S.  federal-state Agricultural Experiment Station 
system (in which states compete against one another in the provision of re- 
search) has become increasingly inadequate to deal with those changes. The 
decentralized institutions of Latin America, organized along the lines of the 
U. S .  system, were set up with the function of serving as public converters of 
The institutional 
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technology available internationally into technology adapted to local condi- 
tions. Although there was a marked increase in budgetary and human resources 
coinciding with initial successes in some areas, available data show that, 
since the early 1970s, the overall trend in Latin America is toward a loss  of 
institutional strength. The signs of crisis identified in some institutions 
and the regional differences noticeable among different systems (Southern 
Zone, Andean region, Central America, and the Caribbean) reflect mainly the 
different characteristics of the economic development and of the process of 
social change generated by technical change specific to each country 
(Table 5.1). 
Aside from region or country-specific developments, which we will examine 
further in the context of the instability of financial resources, certain 
developments common to all countries may explain the failure of the present 
system to adapt to the new situation. 
The "converter model" was suited to a situation characteristic of the 
early stages of institutionalized research. 
Revolution was available from international centers, on the one hand; and, on 
the other hand, it had all the characteristics of a public good. It was well 
suited for involvement of the public sector as the technology in most cases 
did not induce benefits that could be easily appropriated by private groups 
and, therefore, the state could mediate among various urban and rural groups 
to adopt successfully new technologies within the framework of the development 
plan. Although the original model was based on the idea of complementarity 
between international and national centers, in practice, the internal dynamics 
of the IARCs led them to become a practical alternative and a competitor (in 
terns of human resources, for example) for the national institutes. As the 
example of rice in Colombia shows, ICA has lost much of its initiative as a 
result of work conducted at the centers. 
The technology of the Green 
Parallel development at the national level also resulted in a loss of in- 
fluence of the national systems. 
generation of technology by private associations (such as CENICA& and 
FEDEARROZ in Colombia) corresponds to an increasing involvement of the private 
sector in research. The increasing role in the development of agriculture of 
finns producing inputs in the development of agriculture has created new op- 
portunities for the private sector, and the identification of benefits suit- 
able for private appropriation has encouraged private finns to participate in 
the generation and dissemination of technology. 
that research is increasingly becoming a private good and that institutions 
are viewed not as instruments for broad agrarian change reflecting a national 
consensus but, rather, as organizations serving particular interests in the 
agricultural sector (see Pineiro and Trigo, pp. 332-333). 
Direct participation in the process of 
These tendencies indicate 
Within the context outlined above, national institutes must develop pro- 
Although the data indicate an grams under severe shortages of skill supply. 
increasing trend in terms of professional personnel from 1970 to 1980 (as a 
result of a conscious strategy aimed toward developing human resources for 
agricultural research), the sector is plagued by outmigration of highly quali- 
fied personnel, a high rate of turnover of trained personnel which is detri- 
mental to the development of long-term research programs, and a weakening of 
the training programs of the institutes (see Trigo, Pineiro, and Ardila). 
TABLE 5 . 1  
Budgetary Resources Allocated to  Agricultural Research in Latin America and the Caribbean, between 1960 and 1980, 
Selected Years (Constant Value of 1975; Official Money Exchange Rate: National Currency/US dollars, for  Year Selected)* 
~ 
S U B R E G I O N ’  
~~~ ~~ ~ 
1960 1965 1970 1974 
Southern zone (excluding Brazil) 
Brazil 
Andean Zone 
Panama and Central America (excluding Mexico) 
Mexico 
Caribbean (excluding Dominican Republic) 
Dominican Republic 
Latin America and the Caribbean (total) 
‘ 3 1,446’ 
8,2806 
15,63 1 ‘O 
4,412” 
4,66619 
I ,53OZ2 
44 1 2 7  
66,406 
3 1,298 
20,003‘ I 
4,96716 
5,218 
1 ,53OZ3 
49627 
15,5337 
79,045 
32,5943 
24,178’ 
43,05 6 I 2  
4,904” 
9,723 
3,28OZ4 
490” 
1 18,225 
44,7024 
32,8799 
5 7 ,39313 
5,96118 
14,637” 
2,940” 
2,27828 
160.790 
42,559’ 
1 16,797 
6 0 3 4  1 l4 
10,215 
48,35 7” 
1,642 
282,239 
2 , 1 2 8 2 6  
*Preliminary figures, currently being adjusted (Trigo and Piiieiro, 198 1 : Appendix 1 ). 
I Southern Zone includes Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Chile. 
Andean Zone includes Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia and Venezuela. 
Central America includes Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, 
and Guatemala. Caribbean includes Guyana, Suriname, Jamaica, Haiti, 
Barbados, Grenada, Trinidad and Tobago. 
Information for Chile is from 196 1.  
Information for Paraguay is from 1971. 
Information for Chile and Uruguay is from 1973; for Paraguay from 
Information is from 1962. 
Authors’ estimate, based on figures supplied by Boyce and Evenson. ’ Information is from 1972. 
Information is from 1973. 
l o  Information for Bolivia, Venezuela and Peru is from 1962; for Ecua- 
dor from 1965. 
l 2  Information for Bolivia and Venezuela is from 1972 and 1969 re- 
spec tively . 
l 3  Information for Bolivia and Ecuador is from 1973; for Venezuela and 
Peru from 1976. 
l 4  Informa tion for Colombia is from 1979. 
I s  Information for Nicaragua and Guatemala is from 1962; for Hondu- 
ras from 1963. 
Source: P ine i ro  and T r i g o  (1983) .  
1972. ’ Information for Argentina is from 1979. 
Information for Bolivia is from 1962. 
l 6  Information for El Salvador is from 1966; for Guatemala from 1962 
and Panama from 196 1. 
Information for Honduras and Nicaragua is from 1965; for Guatemala 
from 1973; for Panama it was estimated as US$600,000. 
Information for El Salvador is from 1973; Honduras from 1976 and 
Panama from 1975; for Nicaragua it was estimated as US$1,000,000. 
l9 Information is for 1962. 
2o Information is for 1972. 
21  Information is for 1979. 
22 Information for Barbados, Jamaica, Suriname, Grenada, Trinidad and 
Tobago is from 1965; for Guyana it was estimated as US$250,000. 
23 Same information as  1960. 
24 Information for Barbados, Jamaica, Suriname, Grenada, Trinidad and 
Tobago is from 1972; for Guyana from 1973 and for Haiti from 1976. 
2 5  Information for Barbados and Haiti is from 1976; for Jamaica Trini- 
dad and Tobago from 1972. 
26 Information for Haiti is from 1978; for Suriname and Grenada from 
1974, and for Guyana from 1978. 
271nformation was estimated on the basis of 10 per cent o f  the totals 
for Panama and Central America. 
, 
‘f 
w 
Information is for 1977. 
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In terms of human resources (Table 5.21, it  seems that progress can be 
expected a t  the leve l  of the Master's degree i n  the t ra in ing  of personnel i n  
developing countries but that it w i l l  be very slow a t  the leve l  of the doctor- 
ate degree (Evenson and Evenson, p. 227). 
ing fellowships from granting agencies w i l l  not increase subs tan t ia l ly .  A few 
countr ies  are using loans from the World Bank t o  support graduate s tud ies  i n  
the United S ta t e s  by t h e i r  students (Evenson and Evenson). 
The a v a i l a b i l i t y  of foreign t r a i n -  
The phenomenon of migration and the highly fragmented market f o r  scien- 
tists (with low wages f o r  lower ranking personnel and higher wages f o r  person- 
ne l  t ra ined abroad) is even more preoccupying. 
r e l a t ive  t o  those paid by in te rna t iona l  agencies t h a t  are wil l ing t o  pay a 
high wage f o r  short-term consulting services.  Such developments i n  which the 
quant i ty  of personnel is increasing but the qua l i t y  remains inadequate repre- 
sent a preoccupying trend f o r  the development of a s t ab le  research e f f o r t  
National salaries are low 
The market mechanism performs poorly i n  the  a l loca t ion  of research funds 
t o  research. 
nat ional  insti tutes (such as basic  knowledge) is a publ ic  good with i ts  
cha rac t e r i s t i c s  of nonrivalness and nonexcludability ( f r e e  use f o r  anyone once 
it becomes avai lable  except i n  some specific--patentable--instances),  and it 
induces "free riding" (people w i l l  wait f o r  somebody e l s e  t o  incur the cost  of 
research before doing it themselves). 
used t o  a l loca t e  resources and administrative mechanisms have t o  be used. 
This is mainly because a large pa r t  of research produced by 
Therefore, market s igna ls  cannot be 
Some forms of technologies tha t  do not have the cha rac t e r i s t i c s  of a 
publ ic  good are more e a s i l y  appropriated by the pr iva te  sector .  
instances can the pr iva te  sec tor  be expected t o  pa r t i c ipa t e  i n  ag r i cu l tu ra l  
research? Improved machinery and other  forms of technology (mechanical and 
chemical) t ha t  can' be protected by patents  permit s e l ec t ive  access t o  research 
f indings t o  those who finance (or  buy) the product. 
high or because the c o s t s  cannot be covered by the  benef i t s  associated w i t h  
the  new technology the farmer is able t o  capture,  the pr iva te  sec tor  has been 
unwilling i n  the pas t  t o  finance research i n  a reas  such as biological in- 
novations. Crop va r i e t i e s  w i t h  high-yield capacity,  disease and pest  resist- 
ance, etc. fo r  developing countr ies  were generally developed by in te rna t iona l  
research i n s t i t u t e s  and adapted t o  local  conditions by national research 
i n s t i t u t e s .  But introduction of t h i s  new technology had a considerable impact 
on the demand fo r  f e r t i l i z e r s  and other  ag r i cu l tu ra l  inputs, and firms supply- 
ing such inputs acquired large economic gains derived from investment i n  ag r i -  
cu l tu ra l  research through its e f f ec t  on the demand f o r  t h e i r  product 
(pes t ic ides  and f e r t i l i z e r s ) .  
In what other 
Because the r i s k  is too 
The greater  importance of the pr iva te  sector  i n  ag r i cu l tu ra l  research i n  
developed countr ies  r e s u l t s  i n  pa r t  from the grea te r  use of purchased inputs 
by the  agr icu l tura l  sector--although t h i s  is not the only explanatory fac tor .  
The use of f e r t i l i z e r  and other  chemical inputs is higher i n  some developing 
countr ies  than i n  the United S ta t e s  f o r  export crops such a s  cotton. 
by the pr iva te  sector  and the  national income of the country (Table 5.3). 
developed countr ies ,  according t o  1974 data  (Boyce and Evenson), the pr iva te  
A clear cor re la t ion  exists between the proportion of agr icu l tura l  research 
In 
TABJ,E 5 .2  
Human Resources (Professional Personnel) in Agricultural Research in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
from 1960 to 1980 (Selected Years)" 
S U B R E G I O N '  1960 1965 1970 1974 1980 
Southern Zone (excluding Brazil) 
Brazil 
Andean Zone 
Panama and Central America (excluding Mexico) 
Mexico 
Caribbean (excluding the Dominican Republic) 
Dominican Republic 
Latin America and the Caribbean (total) 
36S2 
2005 
3877 
144' 
19013 
6415 
319 
1,353 
816 I ,045 
50O6 764 
643 1,294 
305 lo  283" 
27914 55 I 
96 1 S7I6 
5 1 220 
2,644 4,106 
1,1964 
2,000 
1,694 
33312 
22817 
3521 
1,000 
6,486 
1,364 
2,935 
1,843' 
383  
1,079 
19818 
99 
7,901 
1 
P 
w 
I *Preliminary information, still being analyzed (Trigo and PiAeiro, 198 1: Appendix 2). 
I Southern Zone includes Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Chile. 
Andean Zone includes Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia and Venezuela. 
Central America includes Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador 
and Guatemala. Caribbean includes Guyana, Suriname, Jamaica, Haiti, 
Barbados, Grenada, Trinidad and Tobago. 
* Information for Argentina, Chile and Paraguay is from 1959. 
Information for Paraguay is from 1971. 
Information for Chile is from 1973; for Paraguay it was estimated a t  37. 
Information is for 1959. 
Information is for 1967. 
Information for Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru is from 1959. 
Information for Colombia is from 1979. 
Information for Honduras and Nicaragua is from 1959; for Guatemala 
it was estimated at  20. 
l o  Information for El Salvador and Guatemala is from 1966. 
I '  Information for Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama is from 1971 ; for 
Guatemala, from 1972. 
l 2  Information for El Salvador is from 1973; for Costa Rica and Guate- 
mala it was estimated a t  64  and 58  respectively. 
l 3  Information is for 1959. 
l 4  Information is for 1966. 
I s  Information is for 1959. 
l 6  Information is for 197 1 .  
l 7  Information for Trinidad and Tobago is from 197 1.  
Information for Trinidad and Tobago is from 1978. 
l 9  Information is for 1959. 
*O Information is for 197 1 .  
Estimated. 
Source: Pineiro and Trigo (1983) .  
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TABLE 5.3 
Percentage of Total Agricultural  Research 
Selected Continent/ 
Country, 1974, and Income Level, 1971 
by the  Private  Sector: 
Percentage 
of t o t a l  
ag r i cu l tu ra l  
research 
Con t i nen t /count ry 
North America and Oceania 
Western Europe 
Eastern Europe and USSR 
Latin America 
Africa 
Asia 
Income ( G N P  per capi ta )  
Less than $150 
$ 150-$ 400 
$ 400-$1,000 
$1,000-$1,750 
$1,750 and more 
25.4 
10.8  
8 . 3  
5.1 
2.9 
2 . 2  
5.2 
2.8 
7.4 
7.0 
24.0 
Source: Boyce and Evenson. 
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sector  accounts fo r  about 25 percent of t o t a l  research while i n  resource-poor 
countr ies  of Africa it accounts fo r  less than 3 percent. 
purchased indus t r ia l  inputs used by farmers i s  much lower than i n  the United 
S ta t e s  or  Japan and makes benefi ts  from research much less a t t r ac t ive .  
The proportion of 
When agr icu l tura l  production is oriented toward rura l  consumption o r  
toward the  domestic market, the  pr ivate  sector  may be unwilling t o  invest i n  
research tha t  would increase productivity and induce a f a l l  i n  food pr ices .  
Resource subst i tut ion may be induced by new technologies, such as laborsaving 
mechanization, and lead t o  a reduction i n  costs .  For the pr iva te  sec tor  t o  be 
will ing t o  pay for  the research, the resource subs t i tu t ion  e f fec t  must be suf- 
f i c i en t  t o  cause a decrease i n  t o t a l  cos ts  t ha t  would exceed research cos t s  
and the induced f a l l  i n  farm income. 
pr iva te  sector  can be expected only when the e l a s t i c i t y  of demand f o r  the  good 
is high (export crops, fo r  example) o r  when the state is will ing t o  take meas- 
ures such as p r i ce  subsidies. 
This is why the par t ic ipa t ion  of the 
Part ic ipat ion of the pr iva te  sector  can a l so  be expected i n  cases where 
the crop is grown by a l imited number of producers who can eas i ly  appropriate 
the  benefi ts  from research. Research programs successful from the point of 
view of the pr iva te  sector  have been carr ied out by producer groups such as 
the Colombian Federation of Cotton Growers (see Hertford, e t  a l l .  
producers are not able  t o  ident i fy  the poten t ia l  benefi ts  t o  research o r  may 
not be able  t o  capture the benefi ts ;  t h e i r  par t ic ipa t ion  i n  research invest-  
ment i n  developing countries is limited. 
In general, 
The changes tha t  have occurred a t  the internat ional  leve l  during the  past  
several  years have considerably a l te red  the parameters of agr icu l tura l  
research. Along with t h e  creat ion of an internat ional  network of public o r  
semipublic i n s t i t u t ions  under the umbrella of CGIAR, there is evidence of a 
pr iva te  internat ional izat ion of the technological process whereby transna- 
t iona l  corporations operating i n  developing countries t ransfer  technologies 
developed by t h e i r  research and development departments. The internat ional  
t rade of technological inputs defines the type of technology t o  be supplied a t  
the national level.  
These internat ional  t ransfers  of technology, ra ther  than responding t o  a 
demand originating from within a country, respond t o  the  investment programs 
of these firms. To quote Pineiro and Trigo, "The par t ic ipa t ion  of pr ivate  
industry i n  the generation of agr icu l tura l  technologies is increasing f a s t e r  
than the conditions i n  each country would seem t o  merit." This is the product 
of changes i n  the world market and of the f a s t e r  growth of commercial agr icul-  
ture and agroindustr ia l  a c t i v i t i e s  than peasant agr icul ture .  I t  suggests t ha t  
the state has not been able  t o  control the technological process e f fec t ive ly .  
Evenson and Evenson, i n  t h e i r  study of the lega l  incentive systems i n  Latin 
America, suggest t ha t  developing countries have tended t o  develop legal  
systems of patents  and other forms of protection of i n t e l l ec tua l  property tha t  
do not fo s t e r  creativeness i n  the pr iva te  sector  but create, instead, exces- 
s ive rel iance on the technology developed i n  r icher  countries. 
Mexico, and a few other countries,  by adopting "codes of conduct" fo r  transna- 
t iona l  corporations and "petty patents  systems" more adapted t o  inventions of 
t h e i r  countries,  could fos t e r  more autonomous pr iva te  research i n  Latin 
Brazil, 
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America. Evenson and Evenson (p. 211) suggest that "combinations of public 
sector research, public sector contracts with private firms, and imaginative 
patent systems are optimal." 
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SECTION 6 
INSTABILITY OF FINANCIAL RESOURCES 
One of the most preoccupying trends in agricultural research is the highly 
The annual variations variable nature of funding observed in the past decade. 
in budgetary resources for agricultural research in Latin America, expressed 
in constant (1975) local currency, are shown in Tables 6.1-6.3 and Figures 
6.1-6.14. 
The data plotted in Figures 6.1 through 6.14 are taken from Table 6.1 pub- 
However, there is reason to have doubts about 
lished by I S M .  
American research expenditures. 
the quality of the data. Eduardo Venezian did a careful study of Chile for 
the Impact Study in which he reports that total research expenditures in real 
terms have doubled from 1970 to 1975 while the ISNAR data indicate an oppo- 
site trend m S c o b i e ,  personal communication). 
It is the most complete source of information on Latin 
Index of Real Research Expenditures, Chile, 1960-1980 
From table From 
Year 6.1 E. Venezian 
1960 
1965 
1970 
1975 
1980 
100 
99 
300 
191 
242 
100 
18 1 
283 
529 
721 
Variability of expenditures is not limited to Latin American countries. 
cate that the problem is shared by almost all countries withfficients of 
variation8 ranging from 10 percent to 90 percent over the 1970-1980 period 
but mostly between 20 percent and 50 percent. 
growth rate in research expenditures (12 percent or higher) also tend to ex- 
hibit a high coefficient of variation (45 percent or higher). On a regional 
basis, Asian and African countries have 67 percent and 50 percent, respec- 
tively, of their countries exceeding 25 percent of variation; and South 
America and the Middle East have 80 percent and 100 percent, respectively. 
These aggregate data indicate the serious nature of the problem, given the 
long-run nature of agricultural research programs. Since, on the average, 
70 percent of all institutional costs are absorbed by personnel costs (which 
in the short term can be considered as fixed costs), a decline of 10 percent 
in the resources available to research institutes implies a cut of 40 percent 
to 50 percent in operating capacity and, in practice, jeopardizes future re- 
search programs. 
The IFPRI/ISNAR data for 41 developing countries (Oram et al., 1979) indi- 
Countries that exhibit a rapid 
The funding of agricultural research activities comes from three major 
sources : 
TABLE 6.1 
Latin America and the Caribbean: Budgetary resources for agricultural research from 
1960-1980. Values expressed in constant 1975 currency (in thousands). 
1960 1965 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
~~ ~ ~ ~~ 
North Zone: 
Costa Rica (Colones) 3,565.1 5,210.6 4,637.5 13,521.9 14,387.5 9,235.3 7,081.0 8,972.8 9,937.9 10,839.5 10,329.1 12,525.9 12,143.7 
El Salvador (Colones) 1,177.5 1,072.5' 1,280.3 1,552.2 1,812.5 2,295.1 2,570.0 2,500.0 4,530.4 4,095.8 5,077.2 4,409.2 3,906.3 
Mexico (Pesos) 58,325.0 65,237.0 30,900.0 41,912.5 65,812.5 109,337.5 116,812.5 173,437.5 199,912.5 166,612.5 450,600.0 510,750.0 579,487.5 
Nicaragua (Cordobas) - 5,545.8 7,209.5 7,469.3 7,729.0 6,430.3 6,830.5 7,855.4 8,494.2 9,343.6 7,848.4 8,508.2 9,168.1 
Cuatamala (Quetzales) 1,840.0' - - 1,911.0 1,578.9 2,330.7 2,380.0 2,293.7 2,668.8 2,841.2 3,426.7 3,484.9 
I'anama (Balboas) 417.0 - 1,176.0 1,437.0 1,698.0 1,649.0 1,600.0 1,218.0 850.0 989.9 1,014.2 1,709.8 1,622.3 
Caribbean Zone: 
Barbados (BB Dollars) - 480.0 1,179.7 1,258.5 1,100.9 943.3 843.4 747.4 735.3 735.3 850.4 1,149.4 1,012.0 
Jamaica (J Dollars) - 137.5 138.0 769.0 814.0 1,257.3 1,360.7 1,301.3 1,340.9 1,178.1 841.5 504.9 554.4 
Guyana (C Dollars) - - - - - 1,218.7 1,131.8 1,543.4 1,094.9 583.5 - - - 
Andean Zone: 
Bolivia (Pesos) 10,820.0' - 30,980.0 31,360.0 25,080.0 25,620.0 26,140.0 24,820.0 23,520.0 41,240.0 46,020.0 42,080.0 36,680.0 
Colombia (Pesos) 213,751.2 234,312.0 667,944.0 764,755.0 750,562.0 760,766.0 701,984.0 711,454.0 747,173.0 641,682.0 807,461.0 739,899.0 697,114.0 
Ccuador (Sucres) - 42,850.0 72,628.0 96,552.0 125,806.0 137,143.0 126,025.0 128,825.0 131,600.0 132,880.0 109,321.0 124,156.0 99,666.0 
Venezuela (Bolivares) 19,850.6' 31,757.6 - - - - - - 85,207.7 96,647.0 99,330.8 84,387.4 97,699.8 
i'eru (Soles) 76,948.8' 114,933.6 351,818.0 271,279.2 289,353.6 308,937.6 297,962.4 415,711.2 376,852.0 211,028.0 188,975.0 174,644.0 161,188.0 
~ _ _ _ _ _ ~ _ _ _ _ _ ~ ~  ~~ ~ 
Southern Zone: 
Argentina (Pesos) 936,000.0 1,028,000.0 1,283,000.0 1,534,000.0 1,222,000.0 1,145,000.0 1,165,000.0 1,218,000.0 1,209,000.0 1,301,000.0 
Brazil (Cruzeiros) 67,316.4 - - - 196,569.0 237,608.0 - - 700,307.0 713,405.0 758,027.0 945,240.0 949,561.0 
Chile (Pesos) 13,701.7' 13,554.4 41,173.8 45,711.6 46,787.1 26,745.3 28,690.1 26,151.1 33,252.4 32,957.7 31,283.1 32,373.3 33,208.2 
Paraguay (Guaranies) - - - 68164.0 75,982.0 - - - 208,232.0 205,767.0 213,733.0 441,135 0 
Uruguay (Pesos) 215.0 484.5 372.3 399.0 425.7 525.6 584.1 730.2 573.6 663.3 585.3 773.4 817.8 
1,099,976.4 1,066,998.8 1,113,000.0 
Source: 
Notes: 
Oram and Bindlish, 1981; Pihero and Trigo 1983. 
A Hyphen (-) signifies that the data was not available 
I Corresponds to 1962 
Corresponds to 1964 
' Corresponds tb 1966 
TABLE 6.2 
Latin America and the Caribbean: Annual variations in budgetary resources for agricultural research. 1970 - 1980 
1971/1970 1972/1971 197311972 1974/1973 1975/1974 1976/1975 1977/1976 1978/1977 1979/1978 1980/1979 
Northern Zone 
Costa Rica 2.91 1.06 0.64 0.76 1.27 1.11 1.10 0.95 1.21 0.97 
El Salvador 1.21 1.17 1.26 1.12 0.97 1.80 0.90 1.24 0.62 0.88 
Mexico 1.36 1.57 1.66 1.07 1.48 1.15 0.83 2.70 1.13 1.13 
Nicaragua 1.04 1.03 0.83 1.06 1.15 1.08 1.10 0.84 1.08 1.07 
Guatemala - - 0.82 1.47 1.02 0.96 1.16 1.06 1.20 1.02 
Panama 1.22 1.18 0.97 0.97 0.76 0.70 1.16 1.02 1.69 0.95 
Caribbean Zone 
Barbados 
Jamaica 
Guyana 
1.07 0.87 0.86 0.89 0.88 0.98 1.00 1.16 1.35 0.88 
5.57 1.06 1.54 1.08 0.96 1.03 0.88 0.71 0.60 1.09 
- - - - - - 0.93 1.36 0.71 0.35 
Andean Zone 
Bolivia 
Colombia 
Ecuador 
Venezuela 
Peru 
1.01 0.80 1.02 1.02 0.95 0.09 I .75 1.12 0.91 0.87 
1.14 0.98 1.01 0.92 1.01 1.05 0.86 1.26 0.92 0.94 
1.33 1.30 1.09 0.92 1.02 1.02 1.01 0.82 1.13 0.80 
- - - - - - 1.13 1.03 0.85 1.16 
0.77 1.06 1.07 0.96 1.39 0.91 0.56 0.89 0.92 0.92 
Southern Zone 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Chile 
Paraguay 
Uruguay 
0.84 1.10 1.25 1.20 0.79 0.94 1.02 1.05 0.99 1.08 - - 1.21 - - - 1.02 1.06 1.25 1.00 
1.11 1.02 0.57 1.07 0.91 1.27 0.99 0.10 1.03 1.03 
- 1.11 - - - - - 0.99 1.04 2.06 
1.07 1.07 1.23 1.11 1.25 0.78 1.16 0.88 1.32 1.06 
Source: Table 6.1' 
Note: A hyphen (-) means that the data was not available. 
h t a  r e f e r  to  absolute var ia t ions from previous year. 
I 
P 
4 
I 
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TABLE 6.3 
1970-1980 I n d i c a t o r s  f o r  21 Lat in  American Countries 
(Count r ies  i n  o rder  of  ag. GDP growth r a t e )  
Paraguay 6.9 11.7 63.3 0.28 1.0 1300 0.61 25.6 1.6 7.4 -3.5 
Braz i l  4.9 20.2 53.5 1.15 2.0 2050 0.51 5.7 4.0 1.4 7.0 
Colombia 4.9 3.3 14.5 0.64 1.5 1180 0.22 17.0 6.8 1.1 16.2 
Guatemala 4.6 9.1 29.7 0.39 0.6 1080 0.25 11.6 2.6 1.7 16.2 
Venezuela 3.8 12.1 45.0 1.32 2.5 3630 0.25 10.4 10.4 0.7 18.7 
Nicaragua 3.1 2.5 11.6 0.27 0.7 740 0.55 24.1 1.3 0.6 9.8 
Bol iv i a  3.1 4.2 25.1 0.34 0.5 570 0.61 29.6 0.8 4.2 3.2 
Dom. Rep. 3.1 NA NA 0.20 0.4 1160 0.21 65.4 2.0 0.8 15.2 
Salvador 2.8 25.3 70.9 0.50 1.0 660 0.15 6.3 6.9 1.4 12.0 
Argentina 2.6 7.9 47.4 1.64 6.2 2390 1.30 33.1 4.8 0.5 1.2 
Costa Rica 2.5 0.5 17.2 0.24 0.9 1730 0.22 6.5 4.2 0.0 7 - 3  
Ecuador 2.4 6.7 25.8 0.35 0.8 1270 0.33 9.5 2.5 0.2 7.7 
Mexico 2.3 33.5 88.4 1.36 2.5 2090 0.33 12.0 7.4 0.1 9.5 
Panama 1.9 11.4 29.1 5.33 1.7 1730 0.30 9.0 5.6 0.6 11.0 
Honduras 1.5 -6.8 32.5 0.16 0.3 560 0.48 7.8 0.6 1-11 6.7 
Guyana 1.0 NA NA 1.85 2.7 570 0.43 10.9 6.4 0.2 -1.0 
Jamaica 0.7 -4.5 33.8 0.23 0.4 1040 0.12 7.8 2.9 0.6 -5.5 
Uruguay 0.2 7.5 25.6 0.59 1.4 2810 0.65 8.6 2.2 0.3 4.4 
Barbados 0.0 -2.3 20.0 1.35 2.9 1620 0.14 1.4 23.2 0.0 -6.5 
Peru NA 4.5 32.5 0.33 0.5 930 0.19 12.6 2.6 2.0 5.9 
Explanation of  columns: 
( 1  ) growth r a t e  of  ag. GDP 1970-80 (pe rcen t )  
(2 )  growth r a t e  of  ag. r e sea rch  expendi tures  1970-80 (pe rcen t )  
(3 )  c o e f f i c i e n t  of v a r i a t i o n  i n  ag. r e sea rch  expendi tures  (pe rcen t )  
( 4 )  r a t i o  of  ag. res. exp. t o  ag. GDP 1980 (pe rcen t )  
(5 )  ag. r e sea rch  expendi tures  per c a p i t a  1980 (US $1 
(6 )  GNP per c a p i t a  1980 (US $1 
(7) manlland r a t i o  ( a r a b l e  a rea  per c a p i t a ,  i n  ha) 
(8 )  a r a b l e  a rea  per sc ien t i s t  (ha)  
(9 )  ag. r e sea rch  expendi tures  per ha ( U S  $1 
(10) growth r a t e  of a r a b l e  a rea  1970-80 (pe rcen t )  
( 1  1) growth r a t e  of  f e r t i l i z e r  use 1968-78 (percent )  
Source: P. Oram, ISNAR. 
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1. 
2. 
3. 
Annual a l loca t ions  from the  national budget. 
International grants  and loans from b i l a t e r a l  and mul t i l a t e ra l  sources. 
Channeling a f r ac t ion  of the  proceeds from agr icu l tura l  exports 
towards ag r i cu l tu ra l  research which provides an a l te rna t ive  t o  the 
t r ad i t i ona l  mechanism of budget appropriation. 
The INTA of Argentina, u n t i l  recently, .received budgetary resources from a 
t ax  on agr icu l tura l  exports; and i n  B r a z i l  (CEPLAC, f o r  research on cacao) and 
Colombia (FEDERACAFE, f o r  coffee) research on spec i f ic  commodities is sup- 
ported by levying a tax on such exports. 
financing through a formula based both on sugar exports and on the d i f f e r -  
e n t i a l  between domestic and foreign sugar pr ices  (Trigo and Pineiro,  1984, 
In Colanbia, CENICANA receives 
p. 77).  
The above trend seems t o  indicate  a s h i f t  away from i n s t i t u t i o n a l  a l loca -  
As Trigo and t i o n s  from the publ ic  sector  supported by in te rna t iona l  grants. 
Pineiro (1984, p. 80) remark, events point t o  growing acceptance of the 
pr inciple ,  %whoever benef i t s  pays," indicat ing the  diminishing role  of the  
state and of i t s  a b i l i t y  t o  set p r i o r i t i e s  and the growing influence of p r i -  
vate in t e re s t s .  
sugarcane are financed by COPERSUCAR (the sugar producers' cooperative) and by 
ANDA ( the associat ion f o r  the use of f e r t i l i z e r )  f o r  cot ton,  beans, corn, soy- 
beans, and wheat. Similarly,  i n  ECuador, the research program on pasture un- 
derway a t  IMAP is  financed by the  Highlands Livestock Association. The trend 
toward increasing p r i m t i z a t i o n  and par t icu lar iza t ion  of research should be of 
ser ious concern because: 
In  Braz i l ,  f o r  instance, a nunber of research programs f o r  
1. Nothing indicates  that there is any inherent m e c h a n i s m  capable of 
se t t i ng  nat ional  p r i o r i t i e s  and a l loca t ing  funds t o  neglected areas of 
research; it leaves the market with i ts  d is tor ted  s igna ls  as the so le  
mechanism of a l loca t ion  so tha t  there is a lack of congruence between 
the research budget and the economic importance of spec i f ic  products. 
2.  It might place excessive value on research programs producing "quick" 
r e s u l t s  and lead t o  an exaggerated rel iance on t ransfers  of technolo- 
g i e s  t ha t  sane producer groups are ab le  t o  obtain.  
Nevertheless, it poin ts  toward new approaches i n  the attempt t o  coordinate 
research a t  the national level .  Recent developments i n  sane Latin h e r i c a n  
countr ies  s h u l d  be viewed i n  t h i s  l igh t .  In Chile,  f o r  instance, the IMA 
combines two forms of financing: core  funds or iginat ing i n  the national 
budget and internat ional  a id  which meets the basic operating cos ts  while 
spec i f i c  project fundings are covered by cont rac ts  and agreements with the 
interested pa r t i e s .  In Colombia the coordination of research programs is car- 
r ied out i n  the framework of a National Agricultural  Research Plan which i s  
the too l  used t o  govern the use of available f inanc ia l  resources (Departamento 
National de Planeacion, 1981). Agricultural  Research Councils i n  which a l l  
p a r t i e s  interested i n  research would be represented (consumers and producers 
by farm size, region, e tc . )  have a l s o  been proposed i n  Colanbia a s  mechanisms 
of coordination. In s p i t e  of the increasing ro le  of supplementary sources of 
funding, the causes of f inanc ia l  i n s t a b i l i t y  i n  agr icu l tura l  research are t o  
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be found mainly i n  the f ac to r s  t ha t  a f fec t  national budgets and internat ional  
disbursement s . 
External funding t o  national research systems is subject t o  p o l i t i c a l  
vagaries and t o  the f inanc ia l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  experienced by the  funding a g e x i e s  
themselves. 
cies such as  the World Bank and its a f f i l i a t e s  (IDA i n  par t icu lar )  had t o  re- 
duce t h e i r  lending program due t o  the unwillingness of the United S ta t e s  t o  
contr ibute  t o  an increase i n  resources. Pr ior  t o  1980, external mu l t i l a t e ra l  
assistance,  mainly from IDB and from the World Bank, was increasing rapidly. 
Until the  mid-l970s, mu l t i l a t e ra l  funding was re l a t ive ly  ins igni f icant  (Oram, 
n.d.). 
funding, it increased three times as f a s t .  Th i s  shows tha t  mu l t i l a t e ra l  and 
b i l a t e r a l  a id  of ten  supplement each other. From 1971 t o  1980, the IDB granted 
13 loans t o  e ight  countr ies  i n  Latin America f o r  a t o t a l  of $138 b i l l i o n  
(U. S.). I t  a lso provided nonreimbursable grant a id  f o r  technical cooperation 
t o  20 projects  i n  13 countries.  
to ta l ing  $96 mil l ion (U. S.) i n  Latin America (Trigo and Pineiro, 1984, 
p. 80). 
Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Mexico); but Jamaica, Honduras, and 
Costa Rica among the smaller nations received s igni f icant  suns. With the  i n -  
creasingly blurred d i s t inc t ion  between long-term and short-term development 
programs i n  the  context of the  shared respons ib i l i t i es  of the IMF and the  
World Bank ami the increasingly active ro le  played by those in s t i t u t ions  i n  
the  economic management of Latin American countr ies ,  one can expect t h a t  
condi t ional i ty  programs w i l l  affect research programs i n  the future.  
Nicaragua, f o r  instance,  although it has s igni f icant ly  increased its expendi- 
tures on research (Figure 6.12) has not received loans from the World Bank 
since 1981. 
European countries,  has been generally smaller than mul t i la te ra l  funds and 
more evenly d is t r ibu ted  among countr ies  (Oram, n.d.1. 
a f f e c t  the granting of fundings more d i rec t ly  than i n  the case of mul t i la te ra l  
aid.  
There are no available data a f t e r  1980 when major lending agen- 
After 1975, when it was estimated t o  be roughly equal t o  b i l a t e r a l  
The World Bank granted two research loans 
W l t i l a t e r a l  money has gone mainly t o  larger  countr ies  (Brazi l ,  
Bilateral a id ,  mainly from the United S ta t e s ,  Canada, and Western 
Pol i t ica l  motivations 
Budgetary appropriations f o r  agr icu l tura l  research can be expected t o  
f luc tua te  according t o  the  economic s i tua t ion  i n  the  country. 
funds are paid out of general revenues and that they have t o  compete with 
other p r i o r i t i e s  i n  the  budget, the  var ia t ions i n  the research budget can be 
expected t o  follow the f luctuat ions observed i n  the highly unstable economies 
of Latin America and t o  be more affected than other budgetary i tans .  
the "double bias" exis t ing against  agr icu l tura l  research (an urban b ias  
against agr icul ture  and a tendency t o  underinvest i n  agr icu l tura l  research), 
expenditures on research are probably more affected by the current recession 
than other  budgetary itans. Government revenues f luc tua te  mainly because of 
var ia t ions i n  t a r i f f s  and other  internat ional  t rade taxes (which typical ly  
make up from 25 percent t o  50 percent of t o t a l  revenues i n  LDC) and i n  
domestic taxes on goods and services.  The current recession a f f e c t s  both. 
Given tha t  such 
Given 
In his ana lys is  of the determinants of government expenditures i n  the  
agr icu l tura l  sector ,  V. Elias (1981, p. 27) f o d  tha t  the sources of 
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variations in the share of government expenditures on agriculture in the GDP 
depend more on the variations of the share of expenditures on agriculture in 
agricultural value added than in changes in the share of the agricultural sec- 
tor in the total GDP. In other words, the major determinant of change in the 
share of government expenditures on agriculture in national income is the 
fluctuations in the share of expenditures on agriculture by the government in 
the total budget. This implies that political decisions concerning the allo- 
cation of funds between agriculture and other budgetary items and not economic 
and structural factors are the most important factors explaining variations in 
the research budget. In the case of many important countries (Mexico, Brazil, 
Argentina, and Peru), the repayment of the foreign debt has clearly become, in 
recent years, the most important priority for the short term. 
countries have the oldest research infrastructure and are most affected by 
budgetary instability in research. 
Some of these 
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SECTION 7 
'lHE (DhMODITY BIAS IN ACXICULTURAL RESEARCH 
In t h i s  sec t ion  we turn t o  the issue of b ias  of technical  change and ex- 
amine why many c m o d i t i e s  of major economic inportance are receiving v i r tu -  
a l l y  no research a t ten t ion .  
The evidence on the subject  i s  scant. The relat ionship between research 
expenditures and the value of comnodities i s  a key question i n  determining 
whether resources are al located cor rec t ly  and i n  w h a t  d i r ec t ion  the b i a s  of 
technical  change has occurred. 
are limited because of the d i f f i c u l t y  i n  disaggregating da ta  on research ex- 
pendi tures  and s t a f f  on a comnodity basis. 
Unfortunately, da t a  on investment by c m o d i t y  
Estimates published by the U. S. National Research Council ind ica te  that 
cot ton,  l ivestock and da i ry  products, wheat, rice, sugarcane, and maize ( i n  
decreasing order of impor taxe)  rank among the best-furded ag r i cu l tu ra l  com- 
modities i n  t e r n s  of expenditures i n  1976 (Table 7.1). 
of the commodity value, though, cot ton is  ahead with 3.5 percent while a l l  
other  comnodities represent less than 1 percent of the  value of the  product. 
Some important s tap le  foods of low-income population groups, such as cassava, 
receive hardly any a t ten t ion ,  while export crops, such as coffee,  have been 
the object  of research programs i n  many t rop ica l  countr ies  since the beginning 
of t he  century and continue t o  be aburdantly financed. 
crops ard export crops expressed as a percentage of the value of the commodity 
i s  i n  many instances more important than it is f o r  food crops. 
In  t e r n s  of percentage 
Research i n  t rop ica l  
Judd, Ebyce, ard Evenson have presented da ta  on research expenditures by 
comnodity f o r  1972 through 1979 which a l so  use the  frequency of publ icat ions 
on each commodity as an indica tor  (Table 7.2). Although this indicator  has 
been c r i t i c i z e d ,  mainly on the  grourds t h a t  it does not account f o r  the  geo- 
graphical o r ig in  of the research (many researchers publish i n  foreign jour- 
na ls )  and tha t  basic research ( r a the r  than applied research) f inds  its way 
i n t o  journals  and other  s c i e n t i f i c  publications,  it provides a rough measure 
of t he  emphasis placed on spec i f i c  comnodity programs. 
The trend favoring export crops and underfuniing s tap le  crops does not 
seem t o  vary great ly ,  except f o r  cot ton,  comparing the da t a  i n  Table 7.1 and 
i n  Table 7.2. 
f i b e r s )  and the f a c t  t h a t  technological innovations may have reached an upper 
l i m i t  may be fac tors  accounting f o r  the slowing down of expenditures i n  
cot ton-related research. By con t r a s t ,  "new" export crops, such as soybeans 
a d  vegetables, receive a good deal  of research a t ten t ion .  
The declining world demand f o r  co t ton  (competing with synthet ic  
Research i n  food crops must be judged on the basis of t h e i r  importance i n  
na t iona l  consumption. 
the d a t a  put  together by Oram, et al .  re la t ing  expenditures and s c i e n t i f i c  
man-years by geoclimatic region t o  the share of the t o t a l  population and t o  
the  main s t ap le  comnodities. From these da ta ,  it is concluded, very 
Some ten ta t ive  conclusions can be drawn on the basis of 
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TABLE 7 . 1  
ESTIMATES OF INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL RESEARCH INVESTMENT BY 
MAJOR COMMODITIES, 197 I CONSTANT DOLLARS 
Estimated Research Investment 
Value of 
Commodiry National 
in All International National Investment as 
Commodity. in Developing Centers Centers Proportion of 
Order of Value Nations ( I  976)a ( 1 9 7 ~ 5 ) ~  Product Value 
of Production ($ billions) ($ millions) ($ millions) (percentage) 
~~ ~ 
I .  Rice 
2. Wheat 
3. Sugar cane 
4. Cassava 
5 .  Cattle 
6. Maize 
7. Coconuts 
8. Sweet potatoes 
9. Coffee 
10. Grapes 
11. Sorghum 
12. Barley 
13. Groundnuts 
14. Cotton 
15. Dry beans 
16. Chick peas 
17. Chilies and 
spices 
18. Olives 
19. Grain legumes 
20. Potatoes (white) 
Over 13 
5-6 
5-6 
5-6 
5-6 
3-4 
3-4 
3-4 
2 
2 
I-IR 
1-1% 
1-195 
I-1% 
I - ]% 
I - 1 %  
I - 1 %  
I - I %  
I 
I 
1.9 
3.8 
0 
I .9 
7.9 
4. I 
0 
0.6= 
0 
0 
I .2 
0.5 
0.5 
0 
I .5 
I .2 
0 
0 
1.6 
2.w 
34.7 
35.9 
30.2 
4.0 
54.8 
29.6 
2.0 
3.4 
8.5 
6.9 
12.2 
9.4 
4.0 
60.1 
4.0 
3.0 
4.0 
5 .o 
(25.3) 
8.2 
0.26d 
0.65 
0.50 
0.07 
0.88 
0.75 
0.06 
0.09 
0.40 
0.35 
0.71 
0.62 
0.13 
3.50 
0.25 
0.18 
0.25 
0.33 
(2.00) 
0.68 
SOURCE: Reproduced from Supporting Papers, World Food and Nutrition Study, Vol. 5 (1977), 5 I ,  
by permission of the National Academy Press, Washington, D.C. 
OCenters and programs sponsored by the Consultative Group on International Agricultural 
Research. 
bRough estimate derived by allocating total research expenditures by country according to the 
proportion of standardiz. .; publications. Standardized publications are converted into constant scien- 
tist-years. 
=Additional funds also were spent on these crops at the Asian Vegetable and Research Develop- 
ment Center. 
dThe proportion varied sharply by type of rice: shallow water, 0.40; upland rainfed, 0.16; inter- 
mediate, 0.16; and deep water, 0.05. The international center investment was principally in the first 
two types. 
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TABLE 7.2 
Research as a Percent of the Value of Product, by Commodity, 
Average 1972-79 Period, 26 Countries 
COM.MODITY 
Wheat 
Rice 
Maize 
Cotton 
Sugar 
Soybeans 
Cassava 
Field Beans 
Citrus 
Cocoa 
Potatoes 
Sweet Potatoes 
Vegetables 
Bananas 
Coffee 
Groundnut 
Ccconut 
Beef 
Pork 
Poultry 
Other Livestock 
Africa 
1.30 
1.05 
.44 
.23 
1.06 
23.59 
.09 
1.65 
.88 
2.75 
.21 
.06 
1.56 
.27 
3.12 
.57 
.07 
1.82 
2.56 
1.99 
1.81 
R E G I O N  
Asia 
.32 
.21 
.21 
.17 
.13 
2.33 
.06 
.08 
.51 
14.17 
.19 
.08 
.41 
.20 
1.25 
.12 
.03 
.65 
.39 
.32 
.89 
Latin 
America 
1.04 
.41 
.18 
.23 
.48 
.68 
.19 
.60 
.57 
1.57 
.43 
.19 
1.13 
.64 
.92 
.60 
.10 
.67 
.60 
1.12 
.42 
All 
Countries 
.51 
.25 
.23 
.21 
.27 
1.06 
.ll 
.32 
.52 
1.69 
.29 
.07 
.73 
.27 
1.18 
.25 
.04 
1.36 
1.25 
1.64 
.71 
International 
Centers 
.02 
.02 
.03 
- 
- 
.02 
.04 
- 
- 
.08 
- 
- 
.005 
- 
.02 
0 02 
- 
Sources: M. Ann Judd, James K. Boyce, and Robert E. Evenson, "Investing in 
Agricultural Supply" (Discussion Paper No. 442, Yale University, Economic Growth 
Center, 1983); and USDA, Indices of Agricultural Production, various issues. 
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t en ta t ive ly ,  tha t  "wheat and perhaps barley, millet, sorghum, and groundnuts 
receive a f a i r  share of research resources i n  r e l a t ion  t o  their importance as 
s t ap le  food and tha t  rice, starchy crops, and pulses  probably do not. 
maize, the shares i n  South America are re l a t ive ly  high and those f o r  Central 
America and Africa re l a t ive ly  low. Runinant l ivestock research i n  the  Middle 
East, semiarid t rop ics ,  a d  south America may be adequately funded" (Oram, 
et a l . ,  1979, pp. 129-130 and Table 44). 
For 
There is also some evidence indicating a pos i t ive  cor re la t ion  on a com- 
modity basis between the  expenditures of IARCs and the national expenditures 
f o r  wheat, maize, white potatoes, sweet potatoes, rice, and sorghum. Both 
types of expenditures a r e  less strongly cor re la ted  i n  the  case of grourdnuts, 
beans, millet, ard cassava (see CGIAR Impact StLdy Newsletter). 
a n t s  of investment of spec i f i c  crops have never been c l e a r l y  elucidated. 
f a l l  i n to  tw categories:  
var iables  a f fec t ing  the supply of research. 
The determin- 
They 
var iables  affect ing the demand f o r  research and 
The mechanisms through which demand f o r  technical  innovations is a r t i c u -  
la ted  tend t o  exclude peasants and other groups unable t o  voice t h e i r  demand 
at the leve l  of the state. T h i s  may explain why m i n i m a l  research a t t en t ion  
r e l a t ive  t o  the importance of t he  crops as a source of nu t r ien ts  i s  paid t o  
s o m e  crops. This crop t r ad i t i ona l ly  has been a 
small fann sector  a c t i v i t y  i n  Latin America. Beans represent an important 
source of pro te in  f o r  many Latin Americans, and there  is a great po ten t i a l  f o r  
increasing y i e lds  of beans through improved seeds and farming pract ices ,  but 
the soc ia l  context i n  which they are grown limits the p o s s i b i l i t i e s  of de- 
velopment of n e w  technology. Beans are almost exclusively a crop of the small 
fann sector  grown mainly f o r  l oca l  market consumption. 
sidered a high-risk crop, they of ten receive less cu l t iva t ion  and care than do 
other ,  surer  market crops such as maize and coffee. 
tend t o  be resource poor and do not have access t o  c red i t  f o r  f e r t i l i z e r  and 
chemical control  agents. In every country except Venezuela, the majority of 
fanners i s  not using improved seed and replants  t r ad i t i ona l  seeds from one 
harvest t o  the next. 
Beans are a case i n  point. 
Because they are con- 
Farmers planting beans 
The beans program of CIAT i s  re la t ive ly  new, and many countr ies  have not 
y e t  released va r i e t i e s  develuped with mater ia l  developed by tha t  organization 
because of the general d i f f i c u l t y  of matching a pa r t i cu la r  type of beans with 
the required resis tance characteristics f o r  a pa r t i cu la r  environment. 
Climatic conditions vary considerably, and the conditions and types of 
diseases  found a t  CIAT are not found i n  many countr ies .  
Most countr ies  of Latin America are current ly  importing beans t o  m e e t  
t h e i r  needs. 
suf f ic ien t  i n  beans, there is increasing pressure t o  abandon the small farm 
sector  and focus a t t en t ion  on large farms where beans could be produced as a 
s ingle  crop (intercropping of beans i s  a widespread prac t ice  i n  most coun- 
t r i e s )  with f u l l  mechanization. T h i s  policy i s  i n  e f f ec t  i n  Costa Rica; and 
there is increasing in t e re s t  i n  mechanization i n  Honduras, Guatemala, Panama, 
Venezuela, Paraguay, Argentina, and B r a z i l  (Iowa S t a t e  University, p. 240). 
Because many countr ies  have set a goal of becoming s e l f -  
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Being unable t o  a r t i c u l a t e  t h e i r  atomistic danand through publ ic  channels, 
growers of beans who are marginal producers are losing control  over this crop 
which would require considerable investment i n  on-farm research, farming 
prac t ices ,  and development of d i  SeaSe -resi st ant va riet ies . 
The supply of technological innovations f o r  sane comodi t i e s  has of ten  
been l imited by the f a c t  that research has a re l a t ive ly  low productivity i n  
ea r ly  years. 
lect and c l a s s i f y  germ plasm and t o  create physiological and pathological 
s tud ies  t o  develap the bas i s  f o r  a productive breeding program. 
As Evenson (1978) poin ts  ou t ,  it may t ake  several  years  t o  c o l -  
The time lag between investment and ac tua l  payoff f o r  neglected commodi- 
t i es  w i l l  be longer than f o r  those crops, such as rice, on which research has 
been i n  progress f o r  many years. It i s  not necessar i ly  t rue  that the in t e rna l  
rate of return t o  investment i n  research on neglected crops i n  the ea r ly  years  
is lower than it is on the more established crops (Evenson, p. 231). 
longer ges ta t ion  period does provide an explanation f o r  the observed tendency 
t o  invest  r e l a t ive ly  l i t t l e  i n  the neglected crops such as root crops. This, 
combined with the f a c t  t h a t  t he  state and the  pr iva te  sector  tend t o  value 
short-term gains most highly ( i . e . ,  that their discount rate is high),  ex- 
p l a i n s  w h y  there  are few incent ives  t o  inves t  heavily i n  programs t h a t  have 
uncertain payoffs. 
The 
Another element of explanation i s  provided by the nature of the comodi-  
t ies  neglected by research. Many such crops, such as cassava, tend t o  be 
grown f o r  home consumption of small farmers, are not consumed widely i n  urban 
areas, and have no known i n d u s t r i a l  use (except at an  experimental l eve l ) .  
Some countr ies ,  such a s  Thailand, where cassava ranks f i f t h  i n  terms of 
investment i n  research, export t h a t  crop (Suthad Setboonsarng, personal 
communication), but these a re  i so la ted  cases. 
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SECTION 8 
PATHS OF TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION 
It is useful to look at different paths through which technological inno- 
vations have occurred in order to identify the conditions that have been as- 
sociated with success and t o  learn from them. There are basically two broad 
paths that can be contrasted. The first is when the private sector is the 
generator of technology. This includes producer associations organizing pri- 
vate research institutes with a specialized commodity focus. 
Sugarcane Growers Association and the Rice Growers Association in Colombia 
which have organized private research institutes to solve particular problems 
through research and manage international transfers of technology. Strong 
producer organizations of this type tend to emerge when production of a par- 
ticular commodity occurs in specialized regions with a high degree of homo- 
geneity of production conditions and farm types, most likely medium-sized, 
owner-operated commercial farms. 
Examples are the 
A second private initiative is when the agribusiness sector--in particu- 
lar, seed, chemical, and machinery companies--engages in research and inter- 
national transfers. This has been the dominant path in farm machinery where 
most innovations have originated in small independent firms and where interna- 
tional transfers require minimal, if any, adaptation. This path has also been 
important in the production of new seed varieties, and the recent developments 
in the patentability of biogenetic inventions should further stimulate private 
research activity in this field. The result will be enhanced competition be- 
tween public and private sectors, a desirable feature to stimulate the articu- 
lation of the public sector with its farm sector clientele. 
because private self-interest firms tend to have a better perception of market 
demands and more institutional flexibility in organizing research, including 
organizing cooperative ventures with public research institutions. They, how- 
ever, tend to confine their activities to low-risk, short-run, high payoff 
technological advances. 
This occurs 
We concentrate here on the paths of technological innovations which occur 
Following the discussion in Section 2, we distin- through the public sector. 
guish three cases. 
8.1. State Acting From Above 
A good example of a successful technological path that originated in the 
state acting from above is the development of new rice varieties in Colombia. 
It also shows how a state initiative was coordinated with research by interna- 
tional centers (CIAT) and commodity organizations (FEDEARROZ) 
During the 1950s, the production of food grains in Colombia was rapidly 
falling behind domestic demand. 
import substitution industrialization that induced rapid urbanization and 
large income effects in consumption. 
prices upward and adding t o  inflationary pressures. 
the government t o  divert part of foreign exchange earnings away from essential 
This occurred as a result of a program of 
Excess demand for food was pushing 
In addition, it forced 
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nnports of capital and intermediate goods for industry toward food imports. 
In the mid-l950s, 10 percent of the domestic consumption of rice was im- 
ported. 
import substitution in rice through the promotion of technological change. 
Having witnessed the success of the public research system in the United 
States, it was obvious that the state had to play an active role in stimu- 
lating technological change. 
uniquely original. This focus on rice technology was triggered by a virus 
infestation transmitted by insects that destroyed nearly half of the rice 
acreage in 1956 and 1957. Since the use of insecticides was deemed impossible 
due to the wide range of the insect vector of the disease, the search for re- 
sistant varieties appeared as the only solution. This led to the organization 
of a national rice program (PNA) in 1957 under the direction of the Agricul- 
tural Research Bureau (DIA). In 1962, the DIA was reorganized to create the 
Institute Colombiano Agropecuario (ICA) under the direction of the Ministry of 
Agriculture, and in 1967 the International Center for Tropical Agriculture 
(CIAT) was established. This led to a reorganization of the national rice 
program as a cooperative tripartite arrangement between ICA, CIAT, and the 
National Federal of Rice Growers (FEDFARROZ). The latter is a powerful com- 
modity association that had been created in 1947 as a lobby to oppose the un- 
favorable rice policies promoted by the government. This federation rapidly 
assumed important functions in the technical assistance to rice growers and 
was subsidized by the government for as long as Colombia was importing rice. 
In 1963, a law was passed that levied a duty on all rice milled to provide a 
development fund to FEDEARROZ. 
The Ministry of Agriculture was thus drawn into a campaign to induce 
The institutional formula was going to be 
The Colombian rice program was thus initiated by the state in response to 
It was organized as a triangular economic problems of national significance. 
arrangement between (1) CIAT, charged with the responsibility of importing 
dwarf varieties from IRRI and of multiplying them for the region; (2) ICA, 
engaged in the local adaptation of these varieties and then crossing them with 
domestic varieties to insure grain characteristics compatible with national 
tastes (long grains as opposed to the short grains imported from Asia); and 
(3 )  the Federation which organized local trials and the transfer of technology 
to local farmers. This triangular arrangement proved to be highly flexible 
and effective in successfully unleasing a technological revolution in rice 
production in Colombia. 
As Scobie and Posada and Balcazar et al. have shown, the impact of tech- 
nological change was dramatic. B e t w e e m 7  and 1978, the area planted in- 
creased by 50 percent and yields doubled, transforming Colombia into a rice 
exporting country. Real prices declined by 40 percent allowing poor landless 
and urban consumers to become the main beneficiaries. Scobie and Posada thus 
conclude that "as rice is disproportionately consumed by the lower income 
groups who make limited tax contributions, the net benefits of the research 
program were strongly biased toward them in both absolute and relative terms. 
While the lower 50 percent of Colombian households received about 15 percent 
of household income, they captured nearly 70 percent of the net benefits of 
the research program" (p. 383). The extent of the proconsumer bias was, how- 
ever, closely monitored by government intervention in price formation. 
were allowed to fall but not sufficiently rapidly as to transfer away from 
producers all the gains from technological change. This monitoring by 
Prices 
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the state of the price-cost  re la t ion  allowed pr ices  t o  f a l l  by only 28 perce'nt 
between 1965-1969 and 1970-1974, while cos ts  f e l l  by 30 percent. 
t i o n  i l l u s t r a t e s  the importance f o r  the s t a t e  of coordinating technological 
and economic pol ic ies  f o r  successful technological sequences t o  resu l t .  
This r e l a -  
The rice research program contained two other sources of bias.  One was a 
The new technolo- factor  bias  toward a deepening of the capi ta l - labor  ra t io .  
g i e s  implied a sharp increase i n  the use of f e r t i l i z e r s ,  herbicides, fungi- 
cides,  and pesticides.  A t  the same time, labor requirements per ton of rice 
produced f e l l  by 50 percent. 
labor use from 15.2 mil l ion person/days i n  1965 t o  13.2 mill ion person/days i n  
1978 i n  sp i t e  of large increases i n  area planted and output leve ls  (Pineiro 
and Trigo, p. 141). 
The aggregate r e su l t  f o r  Colanbia was a f a l l  i n  
Another bias  is among production systems. Since technological change was 
motivated by a production crisis (and not, f o r  example, an income crisis among 
small farmers), the research s t ra tegy naturally focused on "building on the 
best," i.e., concentrating on the production conditions where the greatest  
yield increases could be obtained per unit  of research cost. 
focus on i r r iga ted  rice production--a production system f o r  which s ignif icant  
technological advances were available i n  Asia. As the new var ie t ies  diffused 
i n  the medium/large i r r iga ted  farms, output increases forced rice pr ices  down- 
ward. The resu l t  was detrimental t o  small dryland rice producers f o r  whom no 
new cost-reducing technological options were available.  Their share i n  
national output thus f e l l  from 50 percent i n  1966 t o  10 percent i n  1974. 
This led t o  
Information 'is very incomplete, but it seems tha t  dryland producers 
shif ted t o  the next best a l te rna t ive  as rice pr ices  declined. 
of perfect  subst i tut ion between upland rice and i r r iga ted  rice used i n  the 
or ig ina l  study by Scobie et  a l .  may have been too strong. 
ers on the  north coast  p r g  d i f fe ren t  qua l i t i e s  of rice f o r  own or  local 
market consumption. There is a cer ta in  degree of subs t i t u t ab i l i t y  with the 
high-quality rice from i r r iga ted  regions over 1500 km away i n  the Tolima 
Valley but not perfect  subs t i t u t ab i l i t y  ( G .  Scobie, personal communication). 
The assumption 
Small upland farm- 
Whatever the  case may be, the Colombian rice program is an excellent ex- 
ample of a technological path induced by the state acting from above t o  deal 
through the instrument of technology with a problem of national significance. 
I t  shows the importance of coordinating internat ional ,  public, and pr ivate  
organizations i n  managing the process of t ransfer ,  research, adaptation, 
t r ia l ,  and diffusion. 
c a l  with economic pol ic ies .  
been minimized had the par t ic ipa t ion  of rice growers t o  decision making not 
been confined t o  the medium/large producers represented by FEDEARROZ. 
easy technological option was available fo r  upland rice farmers, compensation 
could a t  least have been paid under the form of research programs f o r  the next 
best a l te rna t ive  available t o  them. 
I t  a l so  shows the key ro le  of coordinating technologi- 
Equity issues i n  agricul ture  could, however, have 
If no 
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8.2. State Activated From Below 
Agricultural technology is, to a large extent, an imperfect public good-- 
that is, a good the benefits from which no individual can be excluded but 
where the benefits vary sharply across individuals by region, crops, farm 
types, sources of income, income levels, and consumption patterns. 
is that different groups in civil society have markedly different demands for 
technological innovations and that different groups have a differential 
ability to induce a public sector response to their demands. The organization 
of the public sector also has an impact on its response to interest group de- 
mands for technology, in particular the degree of decentralization of research 
institutions, their degree of autonomy in the management of research budgets, 
and the existence or not of formal mechanisms of consultation with interest 
groups. 
The result 
The pattern of technological change in the production of sugarcane in 
Colombia is a good example of the state being activated from below in response 
to a strong commodity association (Pineiro et al.). 
Colombia is regionally concentrated in the Cauca Valley. 
large sugar mills have dominated the industry. 
these mills expanded output by horizontal expansion and managed independently 
an effort to improve the technology of sugarcane production. 
of the domestic market was an effective bottleneck to output growth, and the 
mills were competing for market shares with technology as one instrument of 
competition. 
Sugarcane production in 
Over time, a few 
During the 1940s and 1950s, 
The limited size 
Sugar is the single most important form of calories in the Colombian diet, 
especially for low-income consumers; but sugar production for industrial use 
and, especially, for export was limited before 1960. 
Sugar Disappearance, Colombia, 1960-1977 (Thousands of Tons ) 
Direct Industrial 
Year consumption use Exports 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
180.6 
205.8 
245.2 
212.9 
227.1 
250.2 
259.0 
252.7 
292.2 
312.3 
339.3 
357.2 
387.1 
414.5 
437.3 
457.6 
489.7 
509.0 
107.3 
115.0 
124.1 
127.8 
140.4 
139.3 
150.7 
140.7 
149.9 
171.7 
164.5 
180.8 
193.1 
213.1 
223.7 
229.5 
246 .O 
254.0 
0.1 
48.7 
65.5 
40.8 
25.7 
94.6 
113.9 
200.3 
238.7 
171.3 
129.4 
165.2 
202.8 
142.5 
128.6 
197.8 
100.2 
59.1 
Source: Pineiro et al., p.  92. 
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With the Cuban Revolution in 1959 and the consequent possibility of ex- 
porting a fixed quota to the United States under highly favorable price condi- 
tions, the Colombian sugar industry entered into a boom period. This induced 
the sugar mills to cooperate in the organization of a cartel that would regu- 
late the distribution of export quotas in the highly conLentrated industry and 
block entry of new competitors. Thus was created ASCOCANA, the Association of 
Colombian Sugarcane Producers. 
sugarcane production and the possibility of incorporating additional land in 
production throughout the 1960s, the main focus of the Association was not 
technological improvement but the promotion and regulation of exports, the 
negotiation of internal prices fixed by the state, and wage bargaining with 
the local labor unions. 
ternational competitive pressures, the Association thus concentrated its power 
on the price, market, and income conditions of production and not on the 
modernization of production itself. 
With excellent ecological conditions for 
As can be expected of a national cartel with no in- 
By 1970, the conditions of production changed sufficiently to force the 
association to deal more squarely with technological issues. 
pansion became severely limited, labor shortages began to occur among cane 
cutters, and reinforcement of the union movement led to significant increases 
in labor costs. The public research agency (ICA in Palmira) had no particular 
interest in developing technological programs to increase exports. At the 
same time, Colombia was promoting a new institutional model for the generation 
and diffusion of technological change based on a shared responsibility between 
the public and private sector for the commercial sectors of agriculture, while 
the public sector only retained full responsibility for rural development 
activities directed at the traditional and marginal sectors. 
this led in 1977 to the organization of a National Sugar Commission integrated 
by representatives of key public sector institutions (Ministry of AgricultuLe, 
price-fixing agency, agricultural bank, etc. 1 and representatives of ASCOCANA. 
The Commission was charged with the responsibility of recommending to the 
national government policies for the production, marketing, export, credit, 
and development of the sugar sector. The Commission was endowed by law with a 
national fund for sugarcane based on a tax levied on sugar prices. 
was used to create a specialized regional research institute, CENICANA 
(Colombian Research Center for Ssarcane), managed jointly by public sector 
(ICA) and private sector (ASCOCANA) representatives. 
vate sector interests thus mobilized the state into organizing a specialized 
agency with very broad policy and technological mandates over which they had a 
substantial degree of control and which was financed by public revenues. 
Horizontal ex- 
For sugarcane, 
"Jis fund 
Strongly organized pri- 
The institutional model that characterizes research on sugarcane in 
Colombia is thus one that evolved from a central role of the state acting with 
relative autonomy (ICA) to one where the state was increasingly captured from 
below by powerfully organized interest groups. 
of both an increasing weakening of the state due to fiscal crises and neo- 
liberal philosophies and a strengthening of the agribusiness sector, a process 
which characterized most of Latin America in the 1970s and which is reinforced 
by the crisis of debt and austerity policies in the 1980s. If state programs 
for the underrepresented sectors of civil society are insufficient to compen- 
sate for their exclusion from agribusiness interests, the bias in research in 
favor of the commercial sector will likely be increased. 
This occurred in the context 
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C E N I d  actively engaged in a broad program of technological research. 
It assisted in the definition and diffusion of a number of innovations such as 
seed control, introduction of new varieties, biological control, and cultural 
practices. This resulted in a 35 percent increase in yields between 1970 and 
1978.' Technological change also allowed horizontal expansion by making pro- 
ductive lands of inferior quality. The technologies introduced were capital 
intensive and led to an increase in the capital/labor ratio greater than 
justified by relative factor price changes. 
allowed the sugar mills to increase their share of the total product at the 
expense of both labor and independent producers of sugarcane. 
lowed them to consolidate the sugarcane cartel and create barriers to the 
entry of potential competitors. 
These technological improvements 
They also al- 
We see, in conclusion, that technological change in sugarcane production 
in Colombia occurred as a result of strong initiatives of producer organiza- 
tions. 
research program over which they retained strong control. 
nological change is, of course, most effective for commodities with powerful 
lobbies and relatively little importance for the macroeconomy. 
quently, tends to be biased in favor of agroindustrial and agroexport crops 
and to neglect the problems of the more disorganized sectors in agriculture, 
typically small farmers and farm workers. 
They were able to activate the state from below into creating a mixed 
This path of tech- 
It, conse- 
8 . 3 .  State Activated From Within 
The state is internally divided, and agents of the state belonging to 
particular groups of bureaucrats or politicians or acting individually influ- 
ence the course of state actions in directions that do not necessarily corres- 
pond either to the logic of the state acting from above or to the logic of the 
state activated from below by pressure groups in civil society. This is par- 
ticularly evident in the case of research on agricultural technology where 
perception of the potential gains from technological innovations (the expected 
payoffs matrix) is often difficult to achieve for both the state at large and 
civil society, while scientists and research administrators can more easily do 
this. The result is that narrow control by outside interests over the course 
of research is difficult to achieve and that scientists and research adminis- 
trators generally have a considerable degree of initiative in establishing 
research priorities. In their study of the U. S .  Agricultural Experiment Sta- 
tion system, Kaldor and Paulsen thus conclude that "the internal decision- 
makers (station directors, department chairpersons, and scientists) decide the 
program and the external decision-makers (the U. S .  Congress and state legis- 
latures) appraise the program and decide how much support to give it" 
(p.  10). 
Ramsdale and Paulsen find that, because scientists are the initiators of pro- 
posals, they have the greatest short-run influence on the choice of topics. 
It was found that the strongest source of signals for them were departmental 
colleagues, journals, and conventions--not interest groups--and only second- 
arily sources of funding. 
Similarly, in a study of how research projects are selected, 
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In the study of the performance of public a ricultural research in 
Argentina (INTA), Colombia (ICA), and Peru (UNA 3 , Pineiro and Trigo found that 
the main source of research inefficiency was pervasive "social disarticula- 
tion," i.e., the lack of connection between the demand for new technology and 
the research effort. What they found is that scientists tend to be motivated 
by peer recognition, especially in international scientific circles, and by 
the challenge of the research effort more than by a demand originating in the 
sector or at the level of the state. The cases of rice and sugar are, by con- 
trast, cases where social articulation was effective in demand guiding the 
research effort. 
An example where research scientists had an important role in initiating a 
research program is the case of the mechanization of tomato harvesting in 
California. Mechanization came about as a response to the end of the Bracero 
Program in 1964 (through which Mexican farm workers had been imported season- 
ally into the United States) and successful unionization of farm workers that 
pushed wages upward dramatically. The role of the University of California, a 
public University, was essential due to the difficulty of mechanizing the har- 
vest of tomatoes that required simultaneously biological and mechanical re- 
search. 
private sectors throughout the process of technological development. 
Also essential was the continued interaction within public and 
The initial momentum was provided by specific scientists of the University 
of California who perceived during World War I1 the recurrence of future labor 
shortages. 
for machine harvesting as well as the design of a mechanical harvester. The 
first tomato varieties adapted to mechanical harvesting were released in the 
late 1940s, and it is only in 1956 that the California Tomato Growers Associa- 
tion started to fund research at the University of California. The first har- 
vesters were built in 1958 by Michigan State University, the University of 
Florida, and Purdue University. 
patented a harvester and licensed a private agricultural machinery company to 
start large-scale production. 
They initiated the search for tomatoes with properties suitable 
In 1959, the University of California 
With some of its scientists having taken the lead, the University of 
California's role as an integral part of the process of technological innova- 
tion was crucial. The University provided practically a l l  the scientific re- 
search capability including the new tomatoes that were the necessary 
prerequisites to success of the overall strategy. 
through which all segments of the industry could interact--hosting seminars 
and demonstrations. Finally, the University was involved in all phases of the 
development and diffusion of the harvester system and the necessary associated 
cultural practices. 
It was a focal point 
A l l  segments of the California canning tomato industry were also in- 
volved. For example, some large and progressive growers were important in 
testing the new machines and new cultural practices and in speaking in favor 
of them at growers' meetings. The Tomato Growers Association,.a group of can- 
ners, and the Blackwelder Manufacturing Company all donated funds to the Uni- 
versity in support of its work. Canners would run "peelability" and llsolidsll 
tests for seed companies on new strains, and some seed companies worked with 
the University to select new tomato strains and were among the first to adopt 
the harvester. University engineers, Blackwelder Manufacturing Company, and 
-78- 
some large  growers a l l  worked together on the machine. 
t o  accept machine-harvested tomatoes was a l so  essent ia l .  
p l i ed  conversion of tomato-receiving f a c i l i t i e s  t o  handle bulk containers,  
expanded washing and sor t ing  operations, greater  expenses f o r  qual i ty  control ,  
d i f f e ren t  hours of operation, and many other cos t ly  adaptations. Since almost 
a l l  tomatoes were grown under contract  and since every contract  specified the 
type of seed t o  be used and qua l i ty  l imitat ions,  adoption could not have oc- 
curred without the consent of processing firms. Once the processors decided 
t o  switch t o  machine-harvested tomatoes, adoption of the harvester was accom- 
plished quickly. 
The canners' decis ion 
T h i s  decision im- 
The percent of the crop harvested by machine increased from 3.5 percent i n  
1964 t o  80 percent three years  later and reached 100 percent i n  1970. 
s h i f t  from hand- t o  machine-harvested methods implied d r a s t i c  changes i n  the 
system of production- -with seeds, cu l t iva t ion ,  machinery, labor requirements, 
chemical inputs, handling, processing, product mix, and marketing a l l  deeply 
affected . 
The 
The cost  savings t o  growers who adopted the technology were s igni f icant  
(Schmitz and Seckler). These savings arose la rge ly  because the harvester was 
a once-through-the-f i e ld  operation, whereas hand harvesting required three  t o  
s i x  passes through the f i e l d  and because the  female machine so r t e r s ,  who re- 
placed the male f i e l d  pickers,  were paid 15 t o  25 percent less per hour. 
The innovation was, of course, ser iously biased toward la rge  fanns and 
against  labor.  
rapidly eliminated and production became concentrated i n  the large fanns. I n  
1964, there  were 1,072 farmers with tomatoes with an average area of 132 acres; 
by 1975, there  were 845 growers l e f t  with an average area of 354 acres. While 
male hand-picking crews were displaced by the machines, new jobs were created 
i n  sor t ing  (unskilled women) and f o r  dr ivers  and mechanics as well as i n  manu- 
factur ing and processing ( sk i l l ed  labor).  
process of desk i l l ing  and s k i l l i n g  of the labor force  involved, increasing the 
polar iza t ion  of wages among farm workers. 
Due t o  economies of scale i n  machinery, smaller growers were 
There was thus a simultaneous 
T h i s  path of technological development where pa r t i cu la r  menbers of the  
state play an ac t ive  promotional ro l e  shows the importance of e f fec t ive ly  
l inking these i n s t i t u t i o n s  with the  po ten t i a l  c l i e n t e l e  f o r  technological i n -  
novations. 
t he  process of technological innovations. 
society of perceiving the  expected payoffs from research which places the 
s c i e n t i s t  i n  the  pos i t ion  of having t o  create the demand f o r  his fu tu re  work. 
This requires  the existence of i n s t i t u t i o n a l  mechanisms that allow s c i e n t i s t s  
and po ten t i a l  benef ic ia r ies  t o  maintain a constant dialogue on the  po ten t i a l  
gains of technological innovations. The second is the tendency fo r  s c i e n t i s t s  
t o  seek peer recognition through s c i e n t i f i c  achievements instead of seeking 
maximum impact on c i v i l  society through technological advances. 
requires ca re fu l ly  designing the ru les  of the  game i n  research i n s t i t u t i o n s  t o  
overcome the resu l t ing  tendency of d i sa r t i cu la t ion  between research e f f o r t  and 
l a t e n t  demand. 
the groups i n  c i v i l  society with the greatest  financing capacity, typ ica l ly  
the  more aggressive producer associations.  
weaker sections,  typ ica l ly  small farmers and farm labor.  
The object ive of t h i s  linkage is t o  overcome three tendencies i n  
One is  the d i f f i c u l t y  f o r  c i v i l  
This also 
And the t h i r d  i s  the  tendency f o r  s c i e n t i s t s  t o  l i nk  up with 
The r e su l t  i s  biases  against  the  
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SECTION 9 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR "HE INTERNATIONAL CENlTRS 
The thrust  of t h i s  paper has been t o  s b w  that there  has been a remarkable 
increase i n  the  size of the  research e f f o r t  on agr icu l tura l  technology i n  the  
t h i r d  world, pushed by the need t o  subs t i t u t e  yield increase f o r  area expan- 
sion as the dominant source of output growth. Yet, this e f f o r t  remains gen- 
e ra l ly  underfunded r e l a t ive  t o  the equi l ibr iun rates of technological change, 
d i s to r t ed  r e l a t ive  t o  optimum biases  d ic ta ted  by shadow prices ,  non-Pareto 
optimun i n  i t s  social impacts, ard highly unstable over time. 
there  has been a nuclear izat ion of the research e f f o r t  with the emergence of a 
number of new actors.  
large polyvalent ag r i cu l tu ra l  research i n s t i t u t e s  the  main sources of tech- 
nological innovations. Strong producer associations i n  pa r t i cu la r  cummodi- 
ties, usually geographically concentrated i n  medium-to-large fanns with 
linkages t o  agroindustry, have taken the i n i t i a t i v e  of organizing the genera- 
t i o n  and d i f fus ion  of technological change either i n  f u l l y  pr iva te ly  funded 
programs, o r  by ac t iva t ing  the state from below i n  the development of j o in t  
ventures and i n  project  funding i n  public research in s t i t u t ions .  With in-  
creasing p o s s i b i l i t i e s  of patenting innovations and of developing monopolistic 
o r  o l igopo l i s t i c  cont ro l  over markets, p r iva te  agribusiness f inns have becane 
important i n  seed, f e r t i l i z e r s ,  agrochemicals, and machinery. Pushed by the 
p r o f i t  motive, these f inns  are well prepared t o  address technological problems 
that require applied research and that promise short-run payoffs. Transna- 
t i ona l  agribusiness f inns  have, i n  par t icu lar ,  becme major agents of tech- 
nological change, commonly f u l l y  control l ing through contracts  ard v e r t i c a l  
in tegra t ion  the technological decisions made by fanners. 
of internat ional  agr icu l tura l  research centers,  coordinated by the Consulta- 
t i v e  Group f o r  Internat ional  Agricultural Research and funded by foundations 
ard b i l a t e r a l  and mul t i l a t e ra l  a id  agencies, has also emerged as a key ac tor  
on the technological scene. While funiamentally or iented toward research on 
s tap le  food crops, these centers have been more e f fec t ive  i n  addressing the 
problems of global food supply than the problems of who produces food and thus 
who der ives  an income from t h i s  ac t iv i ty .  
In addition, 
d No longer are the Minis t r ies  of Agriculture o r  the 
Finally,  the  network 
There is no question t h a t  this mul t ip l ic i ty  of research e f f o r t s  has had a 
high economic payoff and that continued increase i n  investment i n  research 
will be needed f o r  the foreseeable future.  Insuring this w i l l  be a l l  the  more 
d i f f i c u l t  i n  the current context of s t ab i l i za t ion  pol ic ies  that many countr ies  
have t o  implement t o  face up t o  t h e i r  debt crisis and inf la t ionary  pressures. 
Our concern is i n  ident i fying some avenues t o  decrease urderinvestment i n  re- 
search, decrease the soc ia l  b i a s  t ha t  research contains,  and reduce in -  
s t a b i l i t y  i n  the funding of the research e f for t .  The thrust  of our analysis  
has been t o  show tha t  market forces  alone are inadequate i n  providing a solu- 
t i o n  t o  these problems and that greater  a t ten t ion ,  instead, must be given t o  
the dominant role  of i n s t i t u t i o n a l  forces.  Some proposals i n  tha t  d i rec t ion ,  
which derive from the evidence reviewd, a re  the following. 
1. Coordination of the Research Effort .  With the  current  nuclearization 
of the research e f fo r t ,  there is an increasing need t o  insure proper 
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coordination among research initiatives as well as between generators, users, 
and beneficiaries of research. We have seen how some of the more successful 
technological paths have involved the combined efforts of international, 
national, and private institutions with a clearly defined and flexible divi- 
sion of labor between them. Also, we have seen how scientists have a unique 
role to play in identifying the potential payoffs from research. Stronger 
contacts consequently need to be institutionalized between researchers and 
research users. And we have seen how both underinvestment in specific re- 
search areas and biases in technological innovations result from the lack of 
representation of specific social sectors (especially resource-poor farmers 
and landless workers) in the process of definition and budgeting of research 
priorities. A s  of today, coordination among research efforts and communica- 
tion among generators, sellers, users, and beneficiaries of research remain 
woefully inadequate. 
councils be promoted that allow a broad participation of international, pub- 
lic, and private interests in the definition and funding of research priori- 
ties. These institutions should give a voice to the socially marginal sectors 
as well, i.e., provide representation not only in terms of the relative eco- 
nomic importance of commodities and the relative economic importance of pro- 
ducers but also in terms of numbers of individuals affected by the course of 
technology. 
It is consequently essential that national research 
2. Taxing the Beneficiaries. One of the main reasons for which there has 
been underinvestment in public agricultural research is the difficulty of tax- 
ing part of the benefits of research away from its beneficiaries. 
are notably difficult to impose on agriculture due to the political power of 
landlords; and taxes on consumers are equally lifficult to impose due to their 
dispersion, disorganization, and the small size of the benefits they each de- 
rive from technological progress. 
examples of the successful financing of research and diffusion programs by 
taxing beneficiaries. 
fication of the ex ante payoffs from research and a brad mobilization of 
future beneficiaries in accepting to share the costs. This requires both 
greater decentralization of research and greater participation of future bene- 
ficiaries to the definition and budgeting of the research efforts. 
requires the availability of research loans in order to finance the research 
efforts until latent payoffs become taxable actual payoffs. 
can, however, be financed by taxing the beneficiaries, and research that bene- 
fits the weaker segments of the population should remain the financial re- 
sponsibility of the public sector. 
Land taxes 
Yet, the system of export tax to finance ,/ INTA in Argentina and of tax on milling to finance FEDEARROZ in Colombia are 
What is required for this is a much more clear identi- 
It also 
Not all research 
3 .  Coordination Between Technological and Economic Policies. The ex- 
amples of successful technological paths demonstrate the importance of coordi- 
nating technological and economic policies. In particular, the downward pres- 
sure on prices exercised by output-increasing technologies must be carefully 
monitored to allow for technological treadnill effects that will extract from 
agriculture some of the benefits of technological innovations without stifling 
the profitability and, hence, the inducement to invest in agriculture. If 
technological innovations are cost saving but not output increasing, the bene- 
fits of technological change need to be extracted from agriculture through 
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land taxes. 
change i n  agr icul ture  must be understood i n  terms of macroeconomic forces  in- 
cluding the valuation of the  exchange ra te ,  t rade po l i c i e s ,  c r ed i t  terns, 
etc. Here, again, a broad consultative m e c h a n i s m  is needed that can reconcile 
the  conf l i c t ive  pressures which underlie the de f in i t i on  of technological KO- 
nomic pol ic ies .  
The economic po l i c i e s  tha t  a f f e c t  the success of technological 
4 .  Ex Ante Analysis and Part ic ipatory Research. 
l i t t l e  i n f o n a t i o n  and analysis goes i n t o  the de f in i t i on  of research p r i o r i -  
I t  is evident that very 
ties. i he result is that  the soc ia l ly  more vocal and powerful sectors  unduly 
dominate the  course of technological change. 
tendency is  a greater  col laborat ion between na tura l  and soc ia l  s c i e n t i s t s  and 
a greater  par t ic ipa t ion  of research beneficiar ies  (and affected sectors)  i n  
the de f in i t i on  of research p r i o r i t i e s .  
nological progress must be Pareto optimum but t h a t  compensatory programs o r  
research l i n e s  should be considered simultaneously with the de f in i t i on  of pro- 
grams with clear negative payoffs f o r  weak segments of the population. S i m e  
these payoffs are extremely d i f f i c u l t  t o  an t ic ipa te ,  a broadly par t ic ipa tory  
process with continued evaluation of the  impact of research advances seans t o  
be the best guarantee that the biases of technological change can be promptly 
corrected by complanentary technological and i n s t i t u t i o n a l  innovations. 
Needed t o  counteract this 
T h i s  is not t o  say that a l l  tech- 
5. 
Recognizing the ro l e  of i n s t i t u t iona l  forces  i n  influencing the rate and 
Implications f o r  the International Centers 
b ias  of technical change i n  agr icul ture  has several  implications f o r  the CGIAR 
system. 
To a ce r t a in  extent,  the analysis  of the state activated from below/ 
above/within can apply, by analogy, t o  the behavior of the Internat ional  
Centers. There are ,  however, fundamental differences between National 
I n s t i t u t e  and IARCs. Being supranational i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  the IAFCs have a 
grea te r  degree of autonomy from loca l  in te res t  groups than national in- 
s t i t u t i o n s  i n  t e rns  of the de f in i t i on  of t h e i r  research p r i o r i t i e s  and 
programs; but, they a l so  face ser ious l imitat ions i n  their action. 
F i r s t  of a l l ,  they depend on the  countr ies  with which they cooperate 
t o  obtain "signals," i .e. ,  information on the l a t en t  demand f o r  innovations. 
The d i s to r t ions  tha t  a r e  present a t  the nat ional  leve l  a r e ,  therefore,  t rans-  
lated a t  the internat ional  level .  
a. 
b. To the extent tha t  they are able t o  formulate independently a research 
program f i l t e r i n g  the i n f o n a t i o n  received from t h e i r  various contacts  with 
NKIs, they can claim t o  represent the in t e re s t s  of soc ia l  groups that a re  un- 
derrepresented a t  the nat ional  level .  
For instance, donors have s t ressed repeatedly that the work of the IAFKs 
should focus on increasing the prosperity of resource-poor farmers. These 
demands lave a l so  been expressed by the TAC. 
the development of technologies tha t  will require low amounts of purchased 
Several programs have focused on 
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inputs for millet, sorghum, and cassava which are common crops among poor 
farmers. There are also several programs on legumes, such as beans, to 
improve the quality of nutrition among the poor. 
obstacles that such programs have to face is the congruence between the 
priorities established by CGIAR and those of the national strategies where 
priorities are often given to quick payoffs in more productive areas and to 
cash crops for foreign exchange. 
However, one of the 
c. A major obstacle to increasing agricultural productivity occurs at the 
level of translation of the latent demand for innovations into a budgeted de- 
mand. 
relation to national systems are also present at the level of CGIAR. 
growth of expenditures during the 1980s has sharply dropped (1 percent since 
1980 as compared to 20 percent in the first five years of CGIAR according to 
Oram). 
centers. 
being cut back. 
less operational just when its potential multiplier effect is nearest to 
realization. 
The symptoms of underfunding and instability that we have noted in 
Real 
Personnel costs form an increasing proportion of the budget of the 
Thus, as noted by Oram, paradoxically, the system becomes 
Maintenance, equipment replacement, and other operating costs are 
An additional dimension of the financial crisis of the system is that the 
CGIAR must compete for funds with the national institutes that it is supposed 
to support resulting in competing rather than collaborative behavior. 
percentage of donor funding to agricultural research being channeled to the 
CGIAR has dropped from 26 percent in 1971-72 to about 18.5 percent in 1980. 
The 
d. In terms of supply of research, the support provided by the CGIAR to 
national systems poses a problem for a worldwide system that includes coun- 
tries and regions with highly variable resources and levels of development. 
As a result, measurable progress has been quite unevenly distributed. 
basic, applied, and adaptive research and of training staff up to the Ph.D. 
level. 
spects. 
tural research system where they need the assistance and expertise of the 
IARCs at all stages of their training and research efforts. 
Some countries have strong research systems and are capable of undertaking 
Other countries are still at a level of development of their agricul- 
They are able to complement and cooperate with the IARCs in most re- 
Carrying out research with countries with different needs and different 
degrees of complexity in their research system poses serious problems of pri- 
ority setting and coordination in a period where the growth rate in funding is 
declining. 
e. By mandate, the IARCs are required to direct their research toward 
those food crops that will meet the nutritional requirements of the less ad- 
vantaged groups in the LDCs (TAC Secretariat, Review of priorities, 1979); 
but, research on crops such as sorghum, millet, tropical roots, and tubers 
initiated less than 10 years ago does not yet produce results that it is 
possible to adapt to different microecological situations. Increased long-run 
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commitment on the part of the donors is required in order to ensure that such 
programs aimed at reaching resource-poor farmers that are underrepresented at 
the national level be allowed to continue without being affected by financial 
restrictions at the international level. 
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Foot notes 
lReca estimates a long-run supply elasticity for Argentina agriculture 
between 0.42 and 0.52; Chibber, for Indian agriculture between 0.29 and 0.46; 
and Esfahani, for Egyptian agriculture of 0.09 (see Mohan Rao). 
2V. Ruttan (1982, pp. 249-251) defines articulation as the "systematic in- 
terrelation of parts to form an integrated whole" referring to public agricul- 
tural research in the United States. He notes that articulation can be seen 
in the multidisciplinary orientation of experiment stations; in the associa- 
tion between experiment stations and extension services; and in the connec- 
tions and communications that are to be found among theoretical research, 
practical research, and farm production. He also notes, quite interestingly, 
that "decentralization (of the agricultural research system) strengthened the 
articulation between science and farming." 
30x1 the development of national research systems, see Ruttan, 1982 (United 
States, Japan, India, Brazil, Malaysia); Trigo, Pineiro, and Ardila, 1982 
(Colombia, Argentina, Peru); and Pray, FRI Studies, XIX-1, 1982 
(Pakistan/Punjab) . 
(1982). 
4See Ruttan (1982) ; Trigo and Pineiro, I S M  (1984) ; and Pinstrup-Andersen 
5This classification of countries refers to the World Bank's World De- 
61n their study of research benefits in Brazil, Castro and Schuh assume 
7For a survey of models used for the evaluation of costs and benefits of 
8The coefficient of variation is the standard deviation divided by the 
velopment Report, 1982. 
that the OCC is 10 percent. 
research, see Schuh and Tollini (1978). 
mean. 
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